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Abstract 
 
Traditionally in the division of labor between the European level and the Member States it 
was, roughly, the European legislature that set the norms and the Member States that took 
care of enforcing these norms. In various policy areas, an implementation deficit has been 
observed, which is said to be partly due to the Member States facing difficulties with the 
choice of procedural options. For that reason, among others, the European legislature 
increasingly prescribes the enforcement approach to the Member States to back up national 
legislation that implements European law. This Article examines the incoherence of the EU’s 
approach to law enforcement in the areas of consumer, competition, environmental, and 
insider trading laws. After setting out the EU’s legal competences with a view to law 
enforcement, the rather diverse picture—mixes—of private, administrative, and criminal 
law enforcement in the four areas will be illustrated. The authors then ask the question of 
whether this divergence can be explained by an economic reasoning with respect to law 
enforcement. The analysis, however, identifies substantial differences between an ideal 
enforcement mix and the current enforcement approaches used in EU law. Moreover, it is 
suggested that the economic approach could be employed to provide more consistency to 
the use of enforcement tools in EU law. 
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A.  Introduction 
 
Traditionally in the division of labor between the European level and the Member States 
(MS) it was, roughly, the European legislature that set the norms and the MS that took care 
of enforcing the norms that were set at the European Union (EU) level. In some domains, 
the EU takes care of enforcement itself. This is, for example, the case in the European 
competition law domain.1 But in most policy domains—consumer protection, insider 
trading, and environmental protection—the EU needs to rely upon the collaboration of the 
MS to implement and transpose European legislation into national law and to enforce its 
provisions, be it, for example, prohibitions of unfair commercial practices or product safety 
standards. In various policy areas an implementation deficit has been observed, which is said 
to be partly due to the MS facing difficulties with the choice of procedural options.2 For that 
reason, the European legislature increasingly prescribes the enforcement approach to the 
MS to back up national legislation that implements European law. This paper examines the 
incoherence of the EU’s approach to law enforcement. 
 
One cannot help but notice that the enforcement tools used and prescribed in various policy 
areas differ significantly, including elements of private law enforcement, criminal law 
enforcement, etc. In the domain of insider trading and in the environmental area, the Union 
legislature, for example, attempts to use criminal law. In other domains, such as competition 
law, the EU legislature—on the contrary—relies on administrative enforcement and 
encourages the use of private enforcement, but is against the criminalization of breaches of 
European competition law. The consumer law domain provides a different mixed picture 
with a recent emphasis on public law enforcement. As already mentioned, in some areas—
predominantly competition law—the Commission acts as a direct enforcer itself. 
 
There is no such thing as a specific formal legislative competence for the EU legislature with 
a view to law enforcement.3 Hence, the legislature is not limited in choosing a particular 
enforcement strategy. The goal of our paper is to examine in more detail the EU’s strategies 
that have been followed with respect to the enforcement policy in different sectors, and to 
display the different approaches. We will analyze the enforcement approaches in specific 
areas and question the coherence of the motivations given by the EU Commission for 
choosing the particular strategy. In order to enable a rigorous analysis, we will rely on a 
                                            
1 Roger Van den Bergh & Peter Camesasca, European Competition Law and Economics: A Comparative Perspective 
158–59 (2001). 
2 See Directorate General for Internal Policies, Tools for ensuring the implementation and application of EU law and 
evaluation of their effectiveness (2013), 17, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/-
join/2013/493014/IPOL-JURI_ET%282013%29493014_EN.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2016) (noting the alternative label 
“compliance deficit”).  
3 For a discussion of (private) EU law enforcement before a court, see generally Volkert Wilman, Private 
Enforcement of EU Law Before National Courts. The EU Legislative Framework (2015). 
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consistent framework regarding the adequate enforcement measures which were 
developed by law and economics. The law and economics literature has addressed in a 
rather detailed manner what the comparative benefits are of private and public law 
enforcement. Regarding public law enforcement, it distinguishes between administrative 
and criminal enforcement. We will analyze the main lessons from this literature to find out 
whether there are good reasons to apply different enforcement tools to the different policy 
areas—consumer, competition, environment, and insider trading. We will examine the 
approaches taken in the four policy areas against a law and economics perspective to 
disentangle incoherencies. We choose to use law and economics not least because the EU 
institutions themselves are eager to refer to concepts of effectiveness and efficiency.4 
 
Meanwhile, the scope of European law has been considerably expanded, which is why it is 
virtually impossible to address all areas. We have, therefore, selected four particular areas: 
Two areas where the Commission relies strongly on public enforcement, even through 
criminalization—insider trading and environmental law—and two areas where the situation 
is more mixed and where, in addition to public law, private law enforcement also plays an 
important role—consumer law5 and competition law.6  
 
The remainder of the Article is structured as follows: Section B covers the legal competences 
of the EU regarding law enforcement will be analyzed; Section C follows with an illustration 
of the various approaches taken in different areas. Next Section D analyzes law and 
economics arguments for when the different enforcement mechanisms are effective, which 
results in an enforcement matrix indicating the optimal mix between private, administrative 
and public law enforcement. Section E then applies the enforcement matrix to the four 
policy areas to enable an assessment of where the EU lacks coherence in its approach with 
a view to these scientifically established findings. Section F concludes the Article.  
 
  
                                            
4 See, e.g., the works of the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ); Art. 83(2) TFEU is all about 
ensuring the effectiveness of EU legislation which may justify the need for criminal enforcement.  
5 The consumer protection field has recently shown some elements of public law enforcement, however, including 
discussions on collective redress and alternative dispute resolution as an enhancement of the prevailing private 
enforcement. 
6 Essentially, the traditional enforcement approach is based on administrative law, but complementing it with 
private law enforcement is a new development. 
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B.  The EU’s Legislative Competences in Law Enforcement 
 
The essence of the supra-national nature of European Law is illustrated by the fact that MS 
have transferred some legislative competences to the EU and thereby limited their own 
sovereign rights to adopt legislation in the areas in question.7 The scope of such EU 
competences differs as to various legal fields. 
 
Traditionally and for many years, the European legislature has abstained from prescribing 
the law enforcement provisions while harmonizing substantive laws throughout the EU. The 
so-called procedural autonomy of MS was respected.8 Article 67 (1) TFEU, establishes a 
European area of freedom, justice and security, and respects the different legal systems and 
traditions of the MS in particular areas—such as procedural law—which are well established 
at the national level while being rather new at the EU level. This approach, however, has 
been increasingly softened lately.9 One crucial justification is the previously mentioned 
“implementation deficit” of EU law that the Commission observes.10 Of course, the primary 
means to act against implementation deficits is for the Commission to open an infringement 
proceeding according to Article 258 TFEU against a MS. Due to limited capacity, however, 
the European legislature directly impacts MS’ enforcement tools through legislation. There 
is no such thing as a specific competence for law enforcement. The EU has very clearly set 
out its competences for legislating matters regarding criminal penalties. With a view to the 
EU’s competences in criminal law since the Lisbon Treaty, Article 83(2) TFEU provides Union 
competence to impose criminal penalties, it reads: 
 
If the approximation of criminal laws and regulations of 
the MS proves essential to ensure the effective 
implementation of a Union policy in an area which has 
been subject to harmonization measures, directives may 
establish minimum rules with regard to the definition of 
criminal offences and sanctions in the area concerned. 
Such directives shall be adopted by the same ordinary or 
special legislative procedure as was followed for the 
adoption of the harmonization measures in question, 
without prejudice to Article 76. 
 
                                            
7 See Case 26/62, Van Genden Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, EU:C:1963:1; 1 C.M.L.R. (1970). 
8 See generally Wilman, supra note 3, at 394 (discussing the EU’s involvement in enforcement). 
9 See Fabrizio Cafaggi & Hans-W. Micklitz, New Frontiers of Consumer Protection: The Interplay Between Private and 
Public Enforcement 401, 404 (Fabrizio Cafaggi & Hans-W. Micklitz eds., 2009). 
10 See Directorate General for Internal Policies (2013). 
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Considering the events leading up to this insertion, a landmark decision needs mentioning—
Commission v. Council of September 13, 2005. Before that judgment, it was in fact doubtful 
whether the European legislature could force MS via directives to use criminal law. The Court 
of Justice judgment of September 13, 2005 in case C-176/03 changed this view. The Court 
argued that although: 
 
[A]s a general rule, neither criminal law nor the rules of 
criminal procedure fall within the community 
competence . . . the last-mentioned finding does not 
prevent the community legislature, when the 
application of effective, proportionate and dissuasive 
criminal penalties by the competent national authorities 
is an essential measure for combating serious 
environmental offences, from taking measures which 
relate to the criminal law of the MS which it considers 
necessary in order to ensure that the rules which it lays 
down on environmental protection are fully effective.11  
 
With that decision, it was made clear that within the conditions set by the decision of 
September 13, 2005 the Commission may prescribe the use of criminal penalties if the 
necessity conditions are fulfilled and the matter falls within its sphere of competence. The 
EU is, however, clearly not competent to “determine the type and level of the criminal 
penalties to be applied.”12 These new powers have, even before the entry-into-force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, already been used in the so-called Environmental Crime Directive of 
November 19, 2008 and the Ship Source Pollution Directive of October 21, 2009, which will 
both be discussed in further detail below.  
 
Today’s Treaty requires a test of whether criminal law measures are “essential” to achieve 
the goal of effective policy implementation. According to the communication, this test 
requires that the Commission carries out an assessment of the national enforcement 
regimes in place—based on clear factual evidence13—and of the added value of common EU 
minimum criminal law standards—taking into account the principles of necessity, 
proportionality,14 and subsidiarity. In this communication, market abuse is the first policy 
                                            
11 Case C-176/03, Comm’n v. Council, 2005 E.C.R. 542, para. 48. 
12 See Michael Faure, The Continental Story of Environmental Criminal Law in Europe after 23 October 2007, 17 EUR. 
ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 68–75 (2008). 
13 The clear factual evidence should relate to the nature or effects of the crime and to a diverging legal situation in 
all MS, which could be problematic for the effective enforcement of an EU Policy subject to enforcement. These 
proofs preferably should be statistical data allowing assessment of the factual situation. 
14 The Institutions must establish a test of whether criminal law measures are “essential” to achieve the goal of an 
effective policy implementation. It implies that the legislatures need to analyze whether measures other than 
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area cited amongst the ones for which EU criminal law is desirable. Once the need for 
criminal law is established, the concrete criminal measure to be adopted at the EU level 
needs to be identified. EU criminal law can require MS to take effective, proportionate, and 
dissuasive criminal sanctions for a specific conduct. The Commission’s interpretation of 
“minimum rules” is clear: Several documents specify that “EU law sometimes specifically 
determines which types and/or levels of criminal sanctions are to be made applicable.”15 In 
each case, the EU instrument may only set out which sanctions must “at least” be made 
available to the judges in each MS.16 
 
By Article 83 of the Treaty, EU legislation is limited to “minimum” rules on criminal law. 
Consequently, full harmonization is impossible. Moreover, Article 83(2) TFEU mentions that 
the objective is to reach an “approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the MS,” 
meaning a reduction of the degree of variation between the national systems.17 
Nevertheless, according to the principles of legal certainty and proportionality, it is 
important to clearly define what conduct may be considered criminal, as well as the result 
                                            
criminal law measures could not sufficiently ensure the policy implementation and whether criminal law could 
address the problem more effectively. See Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament, The 
Council, The European and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, at 7, COM (2011) 573 final (Sept. 
20, 2011). Moreover, the condition of necessity applies to the level of deciding which criminal law measures to 
include in a particular legislative instrument. Art. 49 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights “the severity of the 
penalty must not be disproportionate to the criminal offence” applies here; Communication From the Commission 
to the European Parliament, The Council, The European and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, at 
8, COM (2011) 573 final (Sept. 20, 2011). See also Marc Groenhuijsen & Jannemieke W. Ouwerkerk, Utima ratio en 
criteria voor strafbaarstelling in Europees perspectief, in Roosacthing strafrecht. Liber Amicorum Theo de Roos 
(Marc S. Groenhuijsen, Tijs Kooijmans & Jannemieke W. Ouwerkerk eds, 2013).  
15 The possibility of making a proposal in the field of criminal law including the type and level of criminal sanctions 
included in an EU directive appears in the COM(2011)573 of September 20, 2011, 8: “Regarding sanctions, 
‘minimum rules’ can be requirements of certain sanction types (e.g. fines, imprisonment, disqualification), levels or 
the EU-wide definition of what are to be considered aggravating or mitigating circumstances”; It also appears in the 
Communication of the Commission on reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial services sector, COM(2010) 
716 final of December 8, 2010, 14: “Any proposals in the field of criminal law should aim at ensuring appropriate 
coherence and consistency across different sectors, in particular when considering the type and level of criminal 
sanctions included in EU directives”; The European Commission page dedicated to the criminal law policy also 
specifies that “The EU can adopt directives providing for minimum rules regarding the definitions of criminal 
offences, for example, rules setting out which behavior is considered to constitute a criminal act and which type 
and level of sanctions are applicable for such acts”, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/criminal-law-policy/ (last 
visited February 13, 2016). Most recently, Directive 2014/57/EU on criminal sanctions for market abuse June 12, 
2004 (OJ L 173/179) (which entered force on July 3, 2014) now explicitly prescribes a maximum term of 
imprisonment and Regulation No 596/2014 of June 12, 2014 (OJ L 173/1) provides for mandatory “administrative 
measures and sanctions.”  
16 Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the Effective Implementation of EU Policies Through Criminal Law, COM 
(2011) 573, at 8–9. 
17 Id. at 9. 
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to be achieved through the implementation of EU legislation. The concept of “minimum” 
rules would gain from clarification to avoid any ambiguity.18  
 
In summary, a rather detailed account has been taken of the Union legislature’s powers to 
introduce criminal sanctions in the MS for certain violations of EU law. The article may be 
applied with a view to any area which has been subject to harmonization measures.19 So, 
for such cases it applies in a horizontal fashion. Nothing comparably specific has, however, 
been said about the use of administrative or private enforcement.  
 
One needs to acknowledge that even if the EU legislature prescribes criminal law as such, 
the details of criminal law enforcement may still differ according to the systems prevalent in 
the different MS—for example, investigative powers available. Even if not stipulated in the 
treaties or in secondary legislation, the CJEU has developed further indications on the EU’s 
approach to law enforcement. Whenever MS remain free in the choice of instruments for 
the implementation of a legal act and ensuring its enforcement, case law holds that these 
sanctions in the case of a violation of implementing legislation should at least be effective, 
proportional, and dissuasive.20 This formulation can be found back in many directives that 
require MS to provide sanctions, which are indeed “effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive.”21 Case law also establishes that the lack of effective prosecution against 
violators of implementing legislation can be considered a violation of European law.22 Hence, 
                                            
18 See Samuli Miettinen, Criminal Law and Policy in the European Union 44ff. (2012)  
The choice of instruments and their inherent limits will also remain a 
point of contention. Express provisions on approximation refer to 
directives as the legal instrument by which the Union may create 
minimum rules. Given substantial limitations to the Directive as an 
instrument, and to the potential lack of direct effect on instruments 
containing minimum rules, the question arises whether any provisions 
on the new Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) may allow 
directly applicable rules on criminal law to be created in the form of 
Regulation, or whether either these or other competences ostensibly 
outside the AFSJ can be exercised to circumvent AFSJ references to 
directives. If the narrative on the development of EU criminal 
competences can be seen as a contest between the centralizing effects 
of EU law and the desire of the Member States to retain criminal law 
as a relatively de-centralized policy area, then Lisbon has changed the 
rules but has not ended the game. What, for example, are ‘minimum 
rules’? 
19 See Art. 83(2) TFEU. 
20 See Case C-68/88, Commission v. Greece, 1989 E.C.R. 339 para. 24. 
21 This is also the formula used in Art. 5 of Directive 2008/99/EC of November 19, 2008 on the protection of the 
environment through criminal law, December 6, 2008, O.J. (L 328) 28, p. 28-37. 
22 Case C-265/95, Commission v. France , 1997 E.C.R. 595 paras. 52ff. 
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Europe is increasingly referring to the requirement to provide effective remedies to cope 
with the implementation deficit. Article 19 (1) II TEU, furthermore, puts the responsibility on 
the MS to “providing remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields 
covered by Union law.”23 
 
In essence, a body of guidelines has been developed that can be labeled the “enforcement 
principle.”24 The CJEU has developed the requirement of effectiveness of EU law as a general 
legal principle.25 In the early case law it was left to the MS to determine how the interests 
of an individual adversely affected by an infringement of EU law were to be protected 
reflecting the principal of national procedural autonomy. Consequently, the principles of 
practical possibility and non-discrimination/equivalence were introduced with regard to the 
remedy that national law would specify. The court therefore started taking a stronger stance 
even in areas where EU law did not foresee specific rules by referring among others to the 
principles of proportionality, adequacy, and effective judicial protection.26 Sometimes the 
CJEU imposed remedies, such as in the case Metallgesellschaft & Hoechst in which it left it 
to the national court to classify the nature of an action brought, whether as an action for 
restitution or an action for compensatory damages.27 Similarly, in competition law the court 
was quite explicit regarding the remedy. For example, in the Manfredi ruling it clarified that 
the injured party must be able to seek compensation not only for actual loss, but also for 
loss of profit.28 Other procedural aspects that CJEU case-law has explicitly touched upon are 
limitation periods, rules of evidence, and access to court.29 In addition to the court rulings, 
we shall set out how the EU legislation in our selected fields has occasionally gone even 
further than requiring MS to make certain remedies available, and has suggested, for 
example, which players were to be empowered to enforce a certain aspect of EU consumer 
or competition law. 
 
                                            
23 This can be regarded as a principle in the sense of Art. 52(2). 
24 See Gerhard Wagner, Private Law Enforcement Through ADR: Wonder Drug or Snake Oil, 51 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 
165, 168 (2014) (On p. 169 Wagner speaks of a “triad of effectiveness, proportionality and dissuasiveness—or 
deterrence”). 
25 See Paul Craig  & Gráinne de Búrca, Text, Cases and Materials 218 (6th ed. 2015). 
26 See id. at 218. 
27 Case C-410/98, Metallgesellschaft & Hoechst v. Inland Revenue, 2001 E.C.R. 134. 
28 Case C-295-298/04 Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA et al, 2006 E.C.R. 461, para. 95; later confirmed 
in Case C-536/11, Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v. Donau Chemie AG and Others, 2013 E.C.R. 366, para 24. 
29 See Craig & de Burca, supra note 25 at 218 et seq. This is also true with a view to Directive 2013/0185 (COD) of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union. That Directive 
will be discussed under 3.2. 
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In essence, the EU is increasingly intervening in the MS’ enforcement domain and the Lisbon 
Treaty specifically stipulates a legislative competence to require criminal law enforcement. 
In the next section, we will illustrate the enforcement approaches used in four selected 
policy areas in more detail. Thereby, we will identify the extent to which the general 
competences have been used.30 
 
C.  Law Enforcement Instruments Divided by Policy Areas 
 
In this Section, we will address how European law-making initiatives approach the 
enforcement mix. We will focus on the enforcement approaches used in consumer law, 
competition law, environmental law, and insider trading. For each policy domain, we will 
first examine to what extent private enforcement is used in the particular policy area; we 
will equally address to what extent steps have been taken to strengthen private 
enforcement—for example, stimulating alternative dispute resolution (ADR) or collective 
redress. Next, we will examine to what extent public enforcement is used and whether 
within public enforcement there is a focus on administrative or criminal law. After sketching 
the enforcement mixes in the four domains under consideration, we will conclude by 
pointing out the incoherence of the approach in the different areas. 
 
I.  Enforcement of European Consumer Law 
 
1.  Respecting Varying National Traditions 
 
In the area of EU consumer protection law, enforcement is entirely in the hands of the MS. 
The Commission has no direct enforcement powers in relation to economic operators who 
infringe EU law and it cannot assess individual cases between consumers and particular 
traders. MS traditions with a view to the enforcement of consumer law are varied. Some MS 
traditionally follow public and others private law enforcement models.31 A minority of 
countries, for example in Austria and Germany, strongly emphasize private law 
enforcement. Scandinavian countries have a public law enforcement tradition. All 
jurisdictions provide for a system of individual consumer claims before the civil courts. The 
                                            
30 We are obviously aware of the fact that there are many more provisions in EU law dealing with law enforcement. 
In that respect, we can, for example, refer to article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, providing a right 
to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, but also for example to Council Regulation No 44/2001 on jurisdiction, 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters—also known as Brussels I. The latter 
instruments are obviously of importance as well, but they are not advocated as enforcement instruments for 
specific domains by the EU legislature, but rather as tools guaranteeing an effective access to justice for EU citizens 
and they do not specifically address the implementation and enforcement of particular policy domains. 
Consequently, those instruments remain outside of this paper’s scope. 
31 See Roger Van den Bergh, Should Consumer Protection Law Be Publicly Enforced?: An Economic Perspective on EC 
Regulation 2006/2004 and its Implementation in the Consumer Protection Laws of the Member States, in COLLECTIVE 
ENFORCEMENT OF CONSUMER LAW 179, 180ff (Willem van Boom & Marco Loos eds., 2007). 
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EU legislature has always respected the different traditions, but more recently has shown a 
preference for some public law enforcement. 
 
Various directives in the field of consumer law in the past show awareness of the different 
enforcement traditions in the MS by leaving the choice of the enforcement mechanisms to 
the MS. Article 11 on the Enforcement in the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive,32 for 
example, leaves it to the MS whether to guarantee the enforcement by “courts or 
administrative authorities,” paying tribute to their respective public or private law 
enforcement traditions.33 The general competence to legislate such consumer matters is 
justified by Article 153 TEC—now in essence Articles 12 and 169 TFEU—according to which 
the EU is to attain a high level of consumer protection and by Article 95 TEC—now Article 
114 TFEU—the so-called harmonization clause.34 National laws were found to be divergent 
and, hence, capable of hindering cross-border trade. In fact, recital 2 of the Directive refers 
to Article 14(2) TEC—now Article 26 TFEU—and asserts that the Directive’s content is “vital 
for the promotion of the development of cross-border activities.” This reflects the 
justifications given in the extended impact assessment.35 Similarly, the Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive,36 which stems from a time when impact assessments were not yet used, 
refers in its recitals to the internal market and consumer protection objectives. It quotes 
Article 100a TEC—now Article 114 TFEU—which concerns the approximation of MS laws and 
mentions the objective of achieving a well-functioning internal market and a high level of 
consumer protection. 
 
European legislation is pertinent when it comes to remedy injunctive relief in the collective 
context.37 A qualified body can bring an injunction for infringements of national provisions 
implementing the EU Directives—for example, consumer credit, package travel etc. 
According to recital 5:  
                                            
32 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of May 11, 2005 concerning unfair business-
to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 
97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 
2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council, June 11, 2005, OJ L 149/22.  
33 See also Council Directive 90/314/EEC of June 13, 1990 (highlighting other directives that leave the design of 
enforcement options open and in this case with package travel, package holidays and package tours); Council 
Directive 93/13/EEC of April 5, 1993 (explaining unfair terms in consumer contracts). 
34 Recital 1. ex Art. 100a TEC pre-Amsterdam became (ex) Art. 95 TEC post-Amsterdam and is now Art. 114 TFEU. 
35 Commission staff working paper on the extended impact assessment of the Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the Internal Market and 
amending Directives 84/450/EEC, 97/7/EC and 98/27/EC (the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive), 10. 
36 See the Council Directive 93/13, of April 5, 1993, on unfair terms in consumer contracts, 1993, OJ L 95/29.  
37 Directive 98/27, of May 19, 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests, June 11, 1998, OJ L 
166 (EC). 
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Whereas one option should consist of requiring one or 
more independent public bodies, specifically 
responsible for the protection of the collective interests 
of consumers, to exercise the rights of action set out in 
this Directive; whereas another option should provide 
for the exercise of those rights by organizations whose 
purpose is to protect the collective interests of 
consumers, in accordance with criteria laid down by 
national law.38 
 
Thus, this Directive shows awareness of the fact that some MS have strong consumer 
associations and others strong public bodies. Again, it stems from the period when impact 
assessments were not common. This Directive refers to Article 100a TEC—now Article 114 
TFEU. 
 
The controversial Consumer Rights Directive needs mentioning.39 Notably when the 
Directive was adopted by the European Parliament on June 23, 2011, its most controversial 
aspect—namely the full harmonization approach—had been significantly mitigated. 
According to Article 23(2), enforcement action can be undertaken by three different groups: 
Public bodies or their representatives, consumer organizations having a legitimate interest 
in protecting consumers, and professional organizations having a legitimate interest in 
acting. One or more of those bodies may act before the courts or the competent 
administrative bodies. Hence, this Directive again leaves scope to accommodate the varying 
MS preferences. MS need to ensure that “adequate and effective means exist to ensure 
compliance with this Directive”—see Article 23(1). Article 24, furthermore, paraphrases the 
notion developed in case-law that “Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties 
applicable to infringements of the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive and 
shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. The penalties 
provided for must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.” Hence, the nature of the 
remedy is specified but the means to achieving it are left to the MS. The legal basis, again, is 
Article 114 TFEU. The impact assessment refers to the fragmentation of consumer laws in 
the MS due to the minimum harmonization approaches in different consumer law 
directives.40 It also refers to a lack of coordination in the EU regulatory framework regarding 
consumer law. 
  
                                            
38 See also Article 3 of the Directive. 
39 Directive 2011/83, of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, 2011, OJ (L 304) 64 (EEC). 
40 See Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the proposal for a directive on consumer rights Impact 
Assessment Report, 2. 
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2.  Public Enforcement 
 
A change—in the sense that the EU legislature took a stronger stance on the desirable 
enforcement mechanisms for certain consumer law problems—started happening subtly 
with the process of the accession of Central and Eastern European countries to the EU, which 
led to almost all accession candidates establishing a public authority.41 As set out in the 1995 
Commission White paper on the Preparation of the Associated Countries of CEE for 
Integration into the Internal Market of the Union,42 the EU required allocating a “general and 
horizontal competence on consumer affairs to one designated authority.” In terms of 
accession to the EU, public agencies were attractive candidates for both sides as it was a 
visible way of showing compliance and commitment on the one hand and being a “preferred 
interlocutor and partner” of the European Commission.43 The EU legislature’s preference for 
public enforcement in Regulation 2006/2004 on consumer protection cooperation—CPC 
Regulation—ties in with this trend.44 The preparatory works reveal a preference for a public 
regulator.45 A particular advantage is seen in the possibility of public authorities to act ex 
ante. The regulation applies only to certain cross-border infringements. Prior to this 
legislation, MS lacked the ability to carry out investigations in another MS.46 The CPC 
Regulation creates an EU-wide network of national enforcement authorities with similar 
investigation and enforcement powers. This meant that MS, where such an authority did not 
exist, had to establish one and at least equip it with a minimum of powers.47 Its legal basis 
is once more Article 95 TEC—now Article 114 TFEU. The CPC network has recently been 
internally and externally evaluated. The Commission report of 2014 discusses, among other 
                                            
41 Except for the Czech and Slovak Republics’ public enforcement was recognized as an indispensable element of 
the overall institutional framework of consumer protection in all CEE countries. 
42 COM (1995) 163 final (May 10, 1995). 
43 See Antonina Bakardijeva Engelbrekt, Public and Private Enforcement of Consumer Law, in Central and Eastern 
Europe: Institutional Choice in the Shadow of EU Enlargement, in New Frontiers of Consumer Protection—the 
Interplay Between Private and Public Enforcement 91, 109 (Fabrizio Cafaggi & Hans-W. Micklitz eds., 2009). 
44 Council Regulation 2006/2004, of the European Parliament and of the Council of October 27, 2004 on Cooperation 
Between National Authorities Responsible for the Enforcement of Consumer Protection Laws (the Regulation on 
consumer protection cooperation). Text with EEA relevance, 9.12.2004, OJ (L 364), 1–11. 
45 See Green Paper on European Union Consumer Protection, at 17, COM (2001) 531 final (Oct. 2, 2001). The Green 
Paper on EU Consumer Protection identified a gap in the enforcement of consumer protection laws relating to 
consumer economic interests in the internal market. It stressed the ability of public authorities to act to prevent 
consumer detriment before it happens. The green paper is said to have been triggering a broad consensus among 
stakeholders. 
46 Recital 2, CPC Regulation. 
47 See Jules Stuyck, Public and Private Enforcement in Consumer Protection: General Comparison EU-USA, in New 
Frontiers of Consumer Protection—the Interplay between Private and Public Enforcement 63, 79 (Fabrizio Cafaggi & 
Hans-W. Micklitzeds eds., 2009). 
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findings, an enhancement of investigative powers, such as the power to carry out test 
purchases, to name infringing traders, to request penalty payments, to recover illicitly 
obtained gains, or to obtain interim measures.48 Another topic is a more active role for the 
Commission itself in the context of the CPC network.49 
 
3.  Private Enforcement 
 
With a view to enhancing the private law enforcement dimension, the EU has acted on 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)—starting with the Recommendation 98/257/EC which 
sets out minimum quality guarantees for all parties involved.50 Importantly, unlike the 
current situation in the EU, it provides for full coverage of ADR bodies for every sector, which 
MS had to implement by 2015.51 Again, Article 114 TFEU is specifically mentioned.52 All ADR 
entities have to meet quality criteria in line with the requirements set out in the Directive. It 
is, however, being stated in recital 21 that “the directive should be without prejudice to the 
form which ADR procedures take in the Member States.” It still leaves some discretion 
regarding the specific form of ADR to be implemented in the MS. Consequently, with this 
legislative document the EU clearly strengthens ADR solutions in consumer law 
enforcement. Hence, this can be regarded as a furthering private law enforcement. Again, a 
clear stance is taken regarding the desirable enforcement mechanisms, restricting MS’ 
choice, both in the cross-border context, and even going further than previous legislation, 
in the national context.  
 
                                            
48 Commission Report on the Functioning of the CPC Cooperation, at 11, COM (2014) 439 (July 2014) (“Report on 
the functioning of Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of October 27, 
2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws 
(the Regulation on consumer protection cooperation).”) In this light a new legislative proposal for a Regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the 
enforcement of consumer protection laws, COM(2016) 283 final (25.05.2016) was published by the European 
Commission. 
49 Id. at 6, referring to p. iii and pp. 45–48 of Public consultation summary. 
50 This was adopted together with a Regulation on Online Dispute Resolution. See Directive 2013/11, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of May 21, 2013 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes 
and amending Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC, OJ (L 165) 63 of June 18, 2013 (Directive 
on Consumer ADR) and Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 
2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes, OJ L 165/1 of June 18, 2013 (Regulation on Consumer 
ODR). 
51 With the exception of health and education. 
52 See for an extensive impact assessment: COM (2011) 793 (Nov. 29, 2011), SEC (2011) 1409 final (Nov. 29, 2011), 
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on Alternative Dispute Resolution for consumer disputes (Directive 
on consumer ADR) and Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Online Dispute 
Resolution for consumer disputes (Regulation on consumer ADR). 
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Previously the EU legislature had passed a mediation Directive.53 With the European Small 
Claims Procedure54 and the European Payment Order55 it, furthermore, sought to enhance 
the private law enforcement dimension of European consumer law in the cross-border 
context. A new regulation of 2015 which updates these two procedures is, by the way, based 
upon Article 81 TFEU as it has only a cross-border dimension.56 The mediation Directive is 
based upon the articles which preceded Article 81 TFEU.57 
 
Legislative action in the area of collective actions is likewise being discussed.58 In the EU, 
“collective action” is defined as a possibility for “many similar legal claims to be bundled into 
a single court action.”59 It refers to both injunctive relief and compensatory relief. Legislative 
action in the field of collective actions was first discussed in two fields separately: In 
consumer law by DG SANCO and in competition law by DG COMP.60 Then DG JUST merged 
these initiatives were in order to contribute considerations from the perspective of the 
harmonization of civil procedure.61 Recently, the EU has issued the following documents: A 
                                            
53 Directive 2008/52 of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 21, 2008 on certain aspects of mediation 
in civil and commercial matters, May 24, 2008, O.J. (L 136), 3–8 (EC). 
54 Commission Regulation No. 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 11, 2007 establishing 
a European Small Claims Procedure, O.J. (L 199), 1–22; recently amended by Regulation (EU) 2015/2421 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 amending Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 establishing 
a European Small Claims Procedure and Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 creating a European order for payment 
procedure, O.J. (L 341), 1–13. 
55 Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 12, 2006 created a 
European order for payment procedure, O.J. (L 399), 1–32; likewise, recently amended by Regulation (EU) 
2015/2421 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 amending Regulation (EC) No. 
861/2007 establishing a European Small Claims Procedure and Regulation (EC) No. 1896/2006 creating a European 
order for payment procedure, O.J. (L 341), 1–13. 
56 See Regulation (EU) 2015/2421 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 amending 
Regulation (EC) No. 861/2007 establishing a European Small Claims Procedure and Regulation (EC) No. 1896/2006 
creating a European order for payment procedure, OJ (L 341), 1–13. 
57 Also, a legal aid directive (Council Directive 2002/8/EC of January 27, 2003 to improve access to justice in cross-
border disputes by establishing minimum common rules relating to legal aid for such disputes OJ EC 2003L 26/41, 
corrigendum OJ EC 2003L 32/15) in the light of its pure application to the cross-border context was justified this 
way. 
58 See for the status quo of the process: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/collective_redress_en.htm 
(last visited February 13, 2016). 
59 Commission Communication, 4. 
60 Documents produced during this time entail: A Commission Green Paper on anti-trust actions, (COM (2005) 672 
(Dec. 9, 2005)); a White Paper in 2008 (COM (2008) 165 (April 2, 2008)). In 2008, the Commission also published a 
Green Paper on consumer collective redress (COM (2008) 794 (Nov. 27, 2008)). 
61 See Christopher Hodges, Collective Redress: A Breakthrough or a Damp Squib?, 37 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 67, 68 (2013). 
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Commission communication,62 which summarizes the debates on collective redress in 
response to the European Parliament’s 2012 Resolution,63 and the Commission’s 
recommendation.64 The Commission’s recommendation states that all MS have national 
collective redress systems based on a number of common European principles. This 
recommendation applies to the field of consumer law, competition law, and more broadly. 
According to its recital 7: 
 
Amongst those areas where the supplementary private 
enforcement of rights granted under Union law in the 
form of collective redress is of value, are consumer 
protection, competition, environment protection, 
protection of personal data, financial services legislation 
and investor protection. The principles set out in this 
Recommendation should be applied horizontally and 
equally in those areas but also in any other areas where 
collective claims for injunctions or damages in respect of 
violations of the rights granted under Union law would 
be relevant.  
 
Importantly “representative action” in the definition of the Commission’s Recommendation 
means: 
 
 An action which is brought by a representative entity, 
an ad hoc certified entity or a public authority on behalf 
of, and in the name of, two or more natural or legal 
persons who claim to be exposed to the risk of suffering 
harm or to have been harmed in a mass harm situation 
whereas those persons are not parties to the 
proceedings.65  
 
                                            
62 Towards a European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress, COM (2013) 3539/3 (June 12, 2013) “Towards 
a European Horizontal Framework for Collective Redress”. 
63 European Parliament Resolution of February 2, 2012 “Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective 
Redress”, 2011/2089(INI). 
64 Commission Recommendation of June 11, 2013 on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective 
redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union law, 2013 O.J. (L 
201) 60. 
65 See II 3(d) of the Recommendation.  
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Consequently, it allows for any kind of representative. Clearly, differentiating between the 
public and private law dimension becomes a bigger challenge in such contexts of group 
litigation.  
 
4.  Summary 
 
Overall, in consumer law it is argued that the traditional lines of public and private law 
enforcement have been broken up to some extent and that the procedural autonomy of the 
MS is in fact on the “countermarch.”66 This development towards strengthening both private 
and public enforcement in the consumer domain has been happening for more than a 
decade.67 It is only to some extent related to European integration; this development has 
also taken place independently of European norms describing it. 
 
So, if one were to summarize the main tendencies concerning the European enforcement 
approach towards consumer law, one could reasonably consider that: (1) There is some 
reliance on private enforcement by stimulating a representative action by a private entity 
and putting some emphasis on ADR and mediation as a furtherance of private law 
enforcement in the broadest sense. Each MS has a civil justice system that allows individuals 
to sue for damages in private actions.68 Mass litigation to seek compensation is not a given 
in every MS, and actions for injunctive relief are more common. Seeking injunctions has been 
enabled by European legislation; (2) there is also a tendency to recommend public law 
enforcement, clearly with the CPC regulation for cross-border cases. Extensions of the 
investigative powers for such public authorities are, for example, discussed. Regarding 
collective redress, any representative, which could also be a public authority, is to be 
empowered as envisaged in the recommendation. European legislation has been less explicit 
regarding the appropriate remedy. Some of the legal documents, however, repeat the 
effectiveness requirements as developed in the CJEU case-law; (3) although the established 
authorities do have the capacity to request to cease an infringement under the penalty of a 
fine,69 these rules neither explicitly concern administrative sanctions nor give any mention 
of criminalization. In consumer law a mixed approach is, therefore, prevalent; and (4) some 
development can be observed whereby the EU legislature increasingly dictates the 
                                            
66 Fabrizio Cafaggi & Hans.-W. Micklitz, Administrative and Judicial Enforcement in Consumer Protection: The Way 
Forward, in New Frontiers of Consumer Protection—the Interplay between Private and Public Enforcement 401 
(Fabrizio Cafaggi & Hans-W. Micklitzeds eds., 2009). 
67 Ianika N. Tzankova & Martin A. Gramatikov, A Critical Note on Two EU Principles: A Proceduralist View on the 
Draft CFR, in The Foundations of European Private Law 421 (Roger Brownsword, Hans-W. Micklitz, Leone Niglia & 
Stephen Weatherill eds., 2011). 
68 See generally Mass Justice. Challenges of Representation and Distribution (Jenny Steele & Willem van Boom eds., 
2011) (commenting on private damage actions in the Member States) and MASS TORTS IN EUROPE. CASES AND 
REFLECTIONS (Willem van Boom & Gerhard Wagner eds., 2014); see also Wilman, supra note 3, at 146–92. 
69 See Article 4 CPC Regulation. 
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enforcement response rather than leaving MS with a choice. In consumer law, we see how 
Article 114 TFEU is used extensively to justify Union legislation. According to Articles 12 and 
169 TFEU, the Union is to contribute to the attainment of a high level of consumer protection 
by the measures it adopts pursuant to Article 114 TFEU. Indeed, impact assessments are 
now complementing the legislative process. 
 
II.  Enforcement of European Competition Law 
 
1.  Public Enforcement 
 
Unlike in consumer law, within competition law the European Commission also acts as a 
direct enforcer and does not for all cases rely on the MS level. European competition law is 
traditionally enforced by public authorities, such as the European Commission, or national 
competition authorities70 and, more recently, private parties, such as competitors, 
purchasers, and consumers.71 The main implementing regulation was Regulation No 17.72 
Currently Article 103 of the TFEU gives the European Council powers to put in place an 
enforcement system, including the imposition of fines. Council Regulation 1/2003 gives the 
Commission powers to enforce these rules and to fine companies for infringements.73 It, 
furthermore, regulates the interplay between the public regulators and the courts with a 
view to competition law enforcement. The EU enforcement system of competition law is by 
and large traditionally based on imposing fines on companies to which the violation can be 
imputed. Recently the European Commission published a proposal for a Directive that is 
supposed to strengthen the effectiveness of the national competition authorities.74  
 
  
                                            
70 Competition Law and Policy in the EU and UK 80ff (5th edn, Barry J. Rodger & Angus MacCulloch eds, 2015). 
71 See Roger Van den Bergh, Private Enforcement of European Competition Law and the Persisting Collective Action 
Problem, 12 MAASTRICHT J. OF EUR. & COMP. L. 12 (2013). 
72 Regulation No. 17 of February 6, 1962, OJ L 13/204. For further details, see Wouter P.J. Wils, The Optimal 
Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law. Essays in Law and Economics, Diss. Utrecht University, 8–9 (2002). 
73 Regulation No 1/2003 which replaced the mentioned Regulation No 17 (which had identical provisions on fines), 
January 4, 2003, OJ L 1. 
74 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council to empower the competition authorities 
of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, 
COM/2017/0142 final - 2017/063 (COD). 
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2.  Private Enforcement 
 
Private compensation claims have been introduced to EU law in the CJEU case-law and 
recently been codified within a Directive on anti-trust damages actions.75 The case-law 
development started in 1974 and argued for the first time that today’s Article 101(1) and 
102 TFEU have a direct effect between private individuals.76 In the landmark judgment of 
2001, in Courage v. Crehan,77 the CJEU held that victims of infringements of EU competition 
law have a right to compensation. The principle was further enshrined in later CJEU case-
law.78 The Directive stipulates an entitlement to full compensation, Article 3, to anyone—
such as direct and indirect purchasers, consumers, umbrella plaintiffs—who suffered harm 
due to an infringement of competition law. Victims should obtain compensation for the 
harm suffered, which covers compensation for actual loss and for loss of profit, and in 
addition to payment of interest from the time the harm occurred until compensation is 
paid.79 It explicitly excludes any form of punitive damages.80 The legal basis, according to the 
Directive, are Article 114 TFEU and Article 103 TFEU, which are instruments giving effect to 
the principles set out in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The Directive applies to all anti-trust 
damages, both individual and collective. In itself it does not set out any details regarding the 
design of collective redress mechanisms. 
 
An important factor is that the Directive on anti-trust damage actions provides that the 
entity responsible for handling these claims is neither the Commission nor a national 
competition authority but the civil courts of the respective MS.81 The interplay between the 
different enforcers is regulated in the already mentioned Regulation No 1/2003.82 The 
                                            
75 Directive 2014/104, on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the 
competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, 2014, O.J. (L 349) 1. See Wilman, 
supra note 3, at 202–44. 
76 Case 127/73, Belgische Radio en Televisie and société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs v. SV SABAM 
and NV Fonior, 1974 E.C.R. 25, p. 51, para 16; Case C-282/95, P Guérin Automobiles v. Comm’n, 1997 E.C.R. 159, 
para. 39. 
77 Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd. v. Bernard Crehan, Bernard Crehan v. Courage Ltd. and Others, 2001 E.C.R. 465. 
78 Case C-295/04, Manfredi, Case 199/11EuropeseGemeenschap v. Otis NV and Others, 2012 E.C.R. 684, para. 41; 
Case 536/11, Donau Chemie u. a., para. 21; Case C-557/12, Kone AG and Others v. ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG, 2014 E.C.R. 
1317, para. 21. 
79 See Art. 3(2) of Directive 2014/104 EU. 
80 See Art. 3(3) of Directive 2014/104 EU. 
81 See Recital (3) preceding Directive 2014/104 (on antitrust damage actions) (holding that anyone can claim 
compensation before national courts for the harm caused to them by an infringement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
(the basic articles concerning EU competition law)). 
82 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of December 16, 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Arts. 81 and 82 of the Treaty (Text with EEA relevance), January 4, 2003, O.J. (L 1), 1–25. 
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regulation marked a change from ex ante notification, to public authorities, to an ex post 
notification system by individual complaints. A decrease in the administrative enforcement 
dimension has, therefore, been expected ever since. 
 
The starting point for drafting the antitrust damages Directive was the so-called Ashurst 
study of 2004 that acknowledges a lack of private damages claims in the MS despite the 
Courage judgment and sets out the reasons in detail.83 This meant that in most MS there 
were no working national provisions on private redress in competition cases. Consequently, 
in competition law, aside from strong public enforcement, emphasis is now put on private 
enforcement. This is regarded as necessary to ensure the full effectiveness of Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU.84 Both dimensions interact to guarantee the “maximum effectiveness of the 
competition rules.”85 
 
Given that the approach selected with a view to collective redress is a horizontal one, the 
suggestions from the Commission’s recommendation—and communication—that have 
been referred to in the previous section are equally valid. Whereas both the green paper86 
and the white paper of 200887 consider the possibility of regulating matters of collective 
redress within the anti-trust damages Directive, the final version of the Directive does not 
include such provisions. This means that the competence to decide whether to introduce 
collective mechanisms and of what sort, is left with the MS; this covers, for example, claims 
by private associations, public authorities or groups of victims. 
 
3.  Summary 
 
Like consumer law, competition law provides a mixed picture. In sum, one can hold that: (1) 
There is a strong reliance on enforcement by public competition authorities at national and 
European level; (2) within public enforcement there is, distinct from the consumer law field, 
a strong reliance upon administrative enforcement. Administrative fines are the primary 
enforcement tools. Criminalization of competition law infringements is explicitly rejected; 
(3) there is a modest layer of private enforcement, which plays an increasingly important 
role; (4) private enforcement powers as a result of Directive 2014/104 on anti-trust damage 
actions, and the preceding case-law, complement the prevailing public enforcement 
approach which, in contrast to the consumer law field, is not only carried out by national 
                                            
83 Ashurst, Study on the Conditions of Claims for Damages in the Case of Infringement of EC Competition Rules, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/economic_clean_en.pdf (last visited 13 February 
2016). The study was not received without criticism. 
84 See Recital 3 of Directive 2014/104 EU. 
85 See Recital 6 of Directive 2014/104 EU. 
86 See COM(2005)672: Green Paper - Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules (SEC(2005)1732). 
87 White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC anti-trust rules, 2008 COM 165 (April 2, 2008). 
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public enforcers—national competition authorities—but also by the European Commission 
itself. The Directive on anti-trust damages clearly grants the right to full compensation by 
means of private law enforcement. Furthermore, punitive damages are excluded; (5) 
regarding collective redress, however, requirements are only expressed in the form of a 
“recommendation,” which is general and not limited to the competition policy area. The 
situation in the different MS varies considerably on this matter. With a view to collective 
redress, it is equally valid, as with consumer law, that the representative could be anyone—
a public or a private player. 
 
III.  Enforcement of European Environmental Law 
 
1.  Private Enforcement 
 
European environmental law also seems, to some extent, to represent a mixture of private 
and public enforcement with, however, a much stronger tendency towards the use of 
criminal law. As far as private enforcement is concerned, we can point to two documents 
being of relevance, the first being the Environmental Liability Directive (ELD), of which the 
scope is, however, rather limited; the second being the Aarhus Convention, which may 
increase possibilities for access to justice for victims of pollution.  
 
The ELD distinguishes between two different liability regimes.88 For a limited set of 
occupational activities listed in Annex III, mostly agricultural and industrial activities, a strict 
liability regime applies.89 The fault regime applies to other occupational activities not listed 
in Annex III.90 The effectiveness of the ELD is, however, doubtful. The Directive only applies 
to a limited definition of damage.91 Personal injury is, for example, excluded from the scope 
of the Directive. Causation is not specifically regulated in the Directive92 and it does not 
regulate cost allocation in cases of multi-party causation either.93 Moreover, MS are free to 
introduce “the defense of having complied with the permit.”94 This can substantially limit 
                                            
88 Directive 2004/35/CE Of The European Parliament and of The Council of April 21, 2004 on environmental liability 
with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage; Report from the Commission of October 
12, 2010 under Art. 14(2) of Directive 2004/35/EC on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and 
remedying of environmental damage [COM(2010)581 final—Not published in the Official Journal]. 
89 Lucas Bergkamp & Anke Van Bergeijk, Scope of the ELD Regime, in The EU Environmental Liability Directive: A 
Commentary 62 (Lucas Bergkamp & Barbara Goldsmith eds., 2013). 
90 See Jing Liu, Compensating Ecological Damage. Comparative and Economic Observations 268 (2013). 
91 See Bergkamp & Van Bergeijk, supra note 89, at 55. 
92 See id. at 70. 
93 Art. 9 of the ELD. 
94 Art. 8(4)(a) of the ELD. 
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the exposure to liability of an operator. Also, the ELD did not introduce compulsory liability 
insurance but merely encouraged MS to take measures promoting the development of 
financial security instruments.95 Given those limitations the literature has strong doubts on 
the effectiveness of the ELD.96 It is also debatable to what extent the ELD constitutes an 
instrument of private enforcement. The Directive has a strong focus on action taken by 
public authorities both in preventive action97 and remedial action.98 It is the competent 
authority that should require that preventive or remedial measures are taken by the 
operator. Natural or legal persons affected by environmental damage cannot themselves, 
on the basis of the Directive, take action but only formulate a request for action to the 
competent authority.99 Some therefore hold that although the ELD uses terms that resemble 
a civil liability regime, it is in essence a public or administrative law regime.100 The crucial 
point is that the ELD does not provide individual victims with a right to bring a claim for 
damages or other remedies against the operator.101 Hence it is doubtful that the ELD 
constitutes a regime of private enforcement. At best one could hold that it has a 
mixed/hybrid character. 
 
Another aspect of private enforcement relates to the EU implementation of the Aarhus 
Convention. Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention provides that, if particular conditions are 
met, access to information, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice in 
environmental matters have to be guaranteed. The EU has largely dealt with the first two 
pillars: Access to information and public participation. In 2003 two directives were 
promulgated that largely dealt with the access to information102 and with public 
participation.103 In the same year a third proposal was introduced104 directed at 
implementing the provisions of the Aarhus Convention related to the third pillar—access to 
                                            
95 Art. 14 of the ELD. 
96 Michael Faure & Kristel De Smedt, The ELD’s Effects in Practice, in The EU Environmental Liability Directive: A 
Commentary 299 (Lucas Bergkamp & Barbara Goldsmith eds., 2013). 
97 Directive 2004/35, art. 5. 
98 Directive 2004/35, art. 6. 
99 Based on Directive 2004/35, art. 12. 
100 Edward Brans, Fundamentals of Liability for Environmental Harm under the ELD, in The EU Environmental Liability 
Directive: A Commentary 38 (Lucas Bergkamp & Barbara Goldsmith eds., 2013). 
101 Ibid. 
102 Access to information, Directive 2003/4/EC. 
103 Public participation, Directive 2003/35/EC. 
104 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on access to justice in environmental 
matters, 2003COM 624 (Oct. 24, 2003). 
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justice. That proposal, however, led to strong opposition in some MS, as a result the 
Commission did not pursue the promulgation of that directive.105 Although recent case law 
holds that MS, and more particularly national courts, have a duty to interpret national law 
in accordance with the objectives laid down in Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention,106 there 
is not yet a generalized access to justice in environmental matters which would encourage 
private enforcement.107 
 
2.  Criminal Enforcement 
 
As far as environmental law is concerned, the European Commission has clearly more faith 
in public enforcement and more particularly in criminal law. The initiative towards the 
criminalization of environmental law in fact dates back to a Convention on the protection of 
the environment through criminal law adopted by the Council of Europe on November 4, 
1998.108As mentioned above,109 as a result of evolutions in case law, the European 
legislature was awarded competences to force MS to prescribe criminal sanctions. In the 
environmental law area, this led to the adoption of two directives, one related to ship-source 
pollution and one to environmental crime, together referred to as the Environmental Crimes 
Directives.110 
 
These Directives clearly demonstrate the belief on the part of the European Commission for 
the need of criminal law as an enforcement mechanism in this field. Consideration 3 in 
Directive 2008/99, in particular, explains that experience has shown existing systems of 
penalties have been insufficient for achieving compliance with environmental protection 
laws. Such compliance, so the text continues, can and should be strengthened by the 
availability of criminal penalties, which demonstrate social disapproval of a qualitatively 
different nature compared to administrative penalties or a compensation mechanism under 
civil law. Consideration 10 of the Directive requires MS to provide for criminal penalties in 
                                            
105 See the study: Measures on access to justice in environmental matters (Article 9(3)), 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/study_access.htm (last visited February 13, 2016). 
106 For a discussion of this case law, see Jan H. Jans & Hans B. Vedder, European Environmental Law. After Lisbon 
228 (4th ed., 2012) (holding that from the case law of the Court (inter alia in the Janecek, Trianel and Slovak Bears 
case) it follows that Art. 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention is applicable across the full breadth of European 
environmental law). 
107 See Chris Backes, Michael Faure & Fokke Fernhout, Legal Background, in Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters 7, (Michael Faure & Niels Philipsen eds., 2014). 
108 Convention on the protection of the environmental criminal law, Strasbourg November 4, 1998, European Treaty 
Series No. 172, also published in Michael Faure and Gunter Heine, Environmental Criminal Law in the European 
Union. Documentation of the Main Provisions with Introductions 397 (2000). 
109 See the evolution of the EU legislative competences in law enforcement sketched above in section B. 
110 O.J. (L 255) 11 of September 30, 2005. 
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their national legislation in respect of serious infringements of provisions of community law 
on the protection of the environment. The Directive does not, however, create obligations 
as regards criminal penalties for individual cases. The updated Directive 2009/123 
concerning ship-source pollution follows a similar model, although it contains specific 
provisions concerning the liability of legal persons; Article 8 of the Directive requires that 
legal persons held liable for environmental offences be punished by effective, proportionate, 
and dissuasive penalties.111 
 
3.  Summary 
 
When reviewing the area of environmental law one can notice some remarkable differences 
with the domain of competition policy which was mentioned above, and inter alia notice 
that: (1) in contrast with competition law and consumer law, enforcement of European 
environmental law works through criminal law. In its Articles 3 and 4 Directive 2008/99 
stipulates various offenses which are consequently enforceable by criminal law. These 
include the illegal shipment of waste, trade in endangered species, or in ozone-depleting 
substances, significant damage to the environment caused by unlawful emissions to the air, 
water or soil, and the unlawful operation of dangerous activities among others; (2) one can 
equally notice that in the area of environmental law, there is some private enforcement, 
which is also potentially collective,112 but that the focus is much more on public enforcement 
and more particularly on criminalization; (3) the environmental crime directives are 
completely silent on the issue of administrative enforcement. This, however, plays an 
important role in the practice of the MS;113 (4) the encouragement of private enforcement 
of individual claims in the environmental liability Directive is rather weak. The access to 
justice pillar of the Aarhus Convention has not yet been fully implemented into EU law; (5) 
the sole instrument of public enforcement of EU policy, at least at EU level, is thus the 
criminal law. Administrative fines are not discussed at the EU level. 
 
IV.  Enforcement of Insider Trading Laws 
 
It is striking that the enforcement of insider trading laws follows to a large extent the same 
philosophy as environmental law: No attempt whatsoever at EU level to stimulate private 
enforcement. The focus is rather on criminal law and to some extent on administrative 
                                            
111 See further on this directive, Michael Faure, The Environmental Crime Directive 2008/99/EC, EUR. J. OF CONSUMER 
L. 193 (2011). 
112 To the extent that the Recommendation concerning collective redress likewise applies in the context of 
environmental policy. Note, however, that this is not binding. 
113 For an overview of administrative environmental law enforcement in a few Member States (the Flemish Region 
in Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and the UK) see Michael Faure & Katarina Svatikova, Criminal or 
Administrative law to Protect the Environment? Evidence from Western-Europe, 24(2) J. OF ENVTL. L. 253 (2012). 
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enforcement in that the criminal law dimension builds upon the administrative law 
dimension.  
 
1.  Private Enforcement 
 
As far as private enforcement is concerned, we can be brief: There are to our knowledge no 
specific initiatives at EU level to stimulate private enforcement of insider trading laws.114 The 
origin of the regulation of insider trading in the EU goes back to the Financial Action Service 
Plan (FASP).115 Following this Financial Action Service Plan, the so-called Market Abuse 
Directive (MAD) was issued in 2003.116 A later directive also provided specific 
implementation rules.117 Moreover, a European Security Committee (ESC) was created118 as 
well as the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR).119 Note that in this MAD—
Directive 2003/6—there was no indication concerning private enforcement. As a result, legal 
doctrine held that MS are not obliged to adopt statutory regulations granting a right of 
compensation to the individual investors.120 So, the MAD leaves it to the discretion of the 
MS to organize private enforcement. 
 
  
                                            
114 In the United States, insider trading is both a crime, which can be punished by monetary penalties and 
imprisonment, and also a civil offense. The public players also have competences, which could be classified as 
administrative. Overall, private enforcement seems to play a minor role only, see M. Ventoruzzo, Comparing Insider 
Trading in the United States and in the European Union: History and Recent Developments (May 26, 2014). 
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 257/2014; Bocconi Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 2442049, p. 26, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2442049 or 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2442049. 
115 Financial services: implementing the framework for financial markets: action plan, COM (1999) 232 (May 11, 
1999). 
116 Commission Directive 2003/6/EC on insider dealing and market manipulation of January 28, 2003.  
117 Directive 2003/124/EC, implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as 
regards the definition and public disclosure of inside information and the definition of market manipulation; 
Directive 2003/125/EC, implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as 
regards the fair presentation of investment recommendations and the disclosure of conflicts of interest; Directive 
2004/72/EC, implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards accepted 
market practices; Regulation (EC) No 2273/2003 on Market Abuse. 
118 Commission Decision establishing the European Securities Committee, COM (2001) 1493 (June 6, 2001). The ESC 
is constituted of officials of Member States government and Commission officials. 
119 Commission Decision establishing the Committee of European Securities Regulators, COM (2001) 1501 (June 6, 
2001). The CESR is constituted of representatives of Member States’ national regulators and Commission 
representatives. 
120 See Vassilios D. Tountopoulos, Market Abuse and Private Enforcement, 11(3) EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 297, 
301(2014). 
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2.  Administrative Enforcement 
 
Adopted in early 2003, the MAD introduced a comprehensive framework to tackle insider 
dealing and market manipulation practices. In order to ensure the enforcement of Directive 
2003/6/EC, MS were required to implement appropriate administrative measures and 
sanctions. This requirement did not imply any consequences on MS’ criminal dispositions. 
Nevertheless, according to the Commission, the current system did not achieve the effective 
protection of the financial markets121 as desired. In December 2010, the European 
Commission issued a communication on “Reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial 
services sector.”122 The European and Securities Market Authority (ESMA)123 replaced the 
Committee of European Securities Regulation on the January 1, 2011. ESMA’s work on 
securities legislation aims at contributing to the development of a single rulebook in Europe 
by improving co-ordination and co-operation amongst securities regulators, as well as acting 
as an advisory group to assist the EU Commission. ESMA is in charge of issuing guidance on 
the common operation of the MAD. 
 
On October 20, 2011, the Commission issued a set of two proposals to review the EU regime 
dealing with market abuse. The first aspect of this reform proposition consists of a proposal 
for a regulation,124 which basically replaces the MAD and incorporates major elements of 
the directives implementing it, cited here above. This proposal for a regulation suggests 
                                            
121 Proposal for Directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation, at 3, COM (2011) 654 
(Oct. 20, 2011). 
122 Communication of the Commission on reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial services sector, COM (2010) 
716 (Dec. 8, 2010). 
123 European Securities and Market Authorities, http://www.esma.europa.eu (last visited February 14, 2016). 
124 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on insider dealing and market 
manipulation (market abuse), COM (2011) 651 final (Oct. 20, 2011). 
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modifications to the prohibition, to the supervisory125 and enforcement powers126 as well as 
to the administrative measures and sanctions127, directly applicable by the MS. The 
Commission justified this choice with the fact that a regulation would be the most 
appropriate legal instrument to define the market abuse framework within the Union 
because it reduces the regulatory complexity related to the diversity of legislation across the 
                                            
125 Two important modifications relate to the expansion of the scope of the prohibition on insider trading (and the 
definition of attempted market manipulation), See Proposal for a Regulation on market abuse, at 29:  
(e) information not falling within paragraphs (a), (b), (c), or (d) relating 
to one or more issuers of financial instruments or to one or more 
financial instruments, which is not generally made available to the 
public, but which, if it were available to a reasonable investor, who 
regularly deals in the market and the financial instrument or a related 
spot commodity contract concerned, would be regarded by that 
person as relevant when deciding the terms  on which transactions in 
the financial instrument or a related spot commodity contract should 
be effected. 
The notions of “precise nature” and “significant effect on prices” relative to insider information in all the other 
paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) are missing in this one. It, consequently, considerably extends the definition of inside 
information. Cf. Mathias  Siems & Matthijs Nelemans, The Reform of the EU Market Abuse Law: Revolution or 
Evolution, 19 THE MAASTRICHT J. OF EUR. & COMP. L. 195 (2012). 
126 See Proposal for a Regulation on market abuse , at 39:  
Regarding regulators power, the regulation introduces reporting of 
suspicious orders and OTC transactions; ensures access to data and 
telephone records of telecommunications operators to investigate and 
sanction market abuse, subject to a judicial warrant; ensures access to 
private premises to seize documents to investigate and sanction 
market abuse, subject to a judicial warrant; grants protection and 
incentives to whistleblowers.  
Art. 19 “Obligation to cooperate,” Art. 20 “Cooperation with third country”: Cross-border cooperation will be 
reinforced. 
127 See Proposal for a Regulation on market abuse , at 47: Chapter 5: “Administrative measures and sanctions”, p. 
47-48: One of the most revolutionary aspects of the proposal for a Regulation is that administrative measures and 
sanctions will be harmonized:  
administrative pecuniary sanctions of up to twice the amount of the 
profits gained or losses avoided because of the breach where those 
can be determined . . . in respect of a natural person, administrative 
pecuniary sanctions of up to €5,000,000 . . . in respect of a legal 
person, administrative pecuniary sanctions of up to 10 % of its total 
annual turnover in the preceding business year . . . Every 
administrative measure and sanction imposed for breach of this 
Regulation shall be published without undue delay, including at least 
information on the type and nature of the breach and the identity of 
persons responsible for it, unless such publication would seriously 
jeopardize the stability of financial markets. 
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Union. Indeed, it would offer greater legal certainty for those subject to the legislation across 
the Union, introducing a harmonized set of core rules, thereby contributing to the 
functioning of the single market.128 
 
3.  Criminal Enforcement 
 
In addition, on the basis of article 83(2) TFEU, the European Commission’s proposition 
entails a directive on criminal sanctions, applicable to insider trading and market 
manipulation. The motivation is that today MS use divergent criminal measures to enforce 
the prohibition of insider trading. The Commission argues, like in the Environmental Crimes 
Directives, that only criminal law can demonstrate social disapproval of a qualitatively 
different nature, compared to administrative sanctions or compensation under civil law.129 
One of the reasons for this legislative action at EU level was the increasing number of cases 
of market manipulation and market abuse. In some of those cases the legal consequences 
of the exercise of investigative and adjudicative jurisdiction by every single MS were far from 
clear. That justified the creation of a European framework.130 
 
In essence, the Union legislature started to rely strongly on criminal law enforcement with 
the Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse 2014/57 of June 12, 2014.131 This 
Directive stipulates now in Article 7 that the MS have to ensure that insider trading is 
punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least four years. This Directive on 
criminal sanctions for market abuse was adopted on the basis of the new article 83(2) TFEU. 
The final version of Regulation 596/2014 was equally issued on June 12, 2014.132 It has in 
Chapter 5 an explicit reference to administrative measures and sanctions, including the 
necessity to impose maximum administrative pecuniary sanctions.133 
 
                                            
128 See Proposal for a Regulation on market abuse, at 5. 
129 Consideration (6) preceding the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on criminal 
sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation, at 8, COM (2011) 654 final (Oct. 20, 2011). 
130 See for an analysis of market manipulation cases with Fortis Bank and with Barclays and the legal problems that 
resulted from that Michiel Luchtman & John Vervaele, Enforcing the Market Abuse Regime: Towards an Integrated 
Model of Criminal and Administrative Law Enforcement in the European Union?, 5(2) NEW J. OF EUR. CRIM. L. 192 
(2014). 
131 (2014) O.J. (L 173) 179. 
132 (2014) O.J. (L 173) 1. 
133 See on the accumulation of administrative and criminal sanctions and the problem this entails Luchtman & 
Vervaele, supra note 130, at 192ff Sarah Wilson, The New Market Abuse Regulation and Directive on Criminal 
Sanctions for Market Abuse: European Capital Markets Law and New Global Trends in Financial Crime Enforcement, 
16 ERA FORUM 427, 440ff (2015). 
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These developments are based on an extensive impact assessment carried out in 2011.134 In 
this document which evaluates various policy options, there is no mention of private law 
enforcement except for a reference to American law.135 The same is true for the 2010 
consultation paper, which precedes and explains the choices in the impact assessment.136 
Note, however, that although private enforcement is nowhere explicitly mentioned, some 
legal doctrine holds that the New Market Abuse Regulation may, by being directly applicable 
against individuals, create obligations that could also be enforced before civil courts.137 
Because private enforcement is not, however, explicitly addressed at EU level—in contrast 
with the case of competition policy—it will be up to the national courts of the MS to 
determine the terms and conditions of such private enforcement.138 The Directive is meant 
to explicitly enhance the administrative law dimension, which, according to its recital 5, has 
“proven to be insufficient to ensure compliance with the rules on preventing and fighting 
market abuse.”139 
 
4.  Summary 
 
Summarizing, the enforcement tools proposed for insider trading, one can notice that: 
 (1) there is no mention whatsoever of stimulating private enforcement, as opposed to the 
domain of environmental law where there is at least a weak attempt; (2) administrative 
penalties are no longer considered sufficient and that criminalization is considered 
necessary. Directive 2014/57 justifies this by referring to the ineffective nature of 
administrative enforcement.140 Today there is a co-existence of both types of sanctions; (3) 
MS may extend their enforcement provisions also to private enforcement or keep up private 
enforcement systems that they have in place. The instruments issued at the EU level—the 
Directive and the Regulation—are silent on private enforcement. 
 
                                            
134 Commission Staff Working Paper, IMPACT ASSESSMENT Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on insider dealing market manipulation (market abuse) and the 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and 
market manipulation , SEC (2011) 1217 final (Oct. 20, 2011). 
135 Some stakeholders that expressed a preference for civil law enforcement are named only in footnote 140 (and 
329, 348) of the impact assessment. 
136 Public consultation on a revision of the Market Abuse Directive (MAD), 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/mad/consultation_paper.pdf (last visited February 
14, 2016). 
137 See Tountopoulos, supra note 120, at 327. 
138 Tountopoulos, supra note 120, at 332. 
139 Recital 5 of Directive 2014/57/EU. 
140 Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of April 16, 2014 on criminal sanctions for 
market abuse (Market Abuse Directive). 
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V.  Incoherence in the Different Areas 
 
Summarizing the European approach towards enforcement in the four domains, which have 
been discussed, one could draw the following table, of course realizing that here it mainly 
indicates on which issues the European approach, not the one in the MS, is most targeted.141 
 
 
 Private Administrative Criminal 
Consumer Yes 
Injunctions 
ADR/mediation  
Limited 
Duty to create public authority in 
specific context for cross-border 
cases (CPC) 
No 
Competition Yes 
Directive  
Yes, strongly 
Provisions on fines 
No 
Environment Limited (only ELD) No  Yes 
Insider Trading No Yes, system previously based on 
administrative fines is kept in place 
and criminal sanctions are added on 
top  
Yes 
Table 1: Enforcement approaches in the EU.  
 
 
This, necessarily simplified, overview shows that there is considerable divergence in the EU 
approach towards enforcement. This divergence becomes especially clear when addressing 
private enforcement. This is strongly present in the consumer law area and to be 
implemented in the competition law domain. Regarding consumer law, the main 
developments to strengthen private law enforcement are the Injunctions Directive and 
legislation that introduces ADR bodies. Developments that have not been discussed in detail 
for the cross-border context, furthermore, concern the Regulation of small claims and the 
European order for payment procedure. The traditions in the MS regarding consumer law 
enforcement are divergent. Some have traditionally relied on private law enforcement and 
others on public law enforcement. With the CPC regulation, a public law element was 
                                            
141 Thus, it cannot sufficiently consider specific nuances or details, such as proposals towards collective action 
(aiming at strengthening private enforcement) in some domains. Recall that the recommendation on collective 
redress has a horizontal character, but that it is non-binding. 
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introduced in every MS independent of its tradition. This is, however, only true for a limited 
set of cross-border violations. The Commission saw a particular need because of the lack of 
possibilities of the national enforcers to investigate in other European MS and carry out ex 
ante monitoring and market surveillance. Possible extensions of the investigative powers, 
just as a more active role for the European Commission itself may be the content of future 
legislative proposals. The assessment of the CPC regulation and the new proposal it led to 
reveals that the public enforcement dimension is regarded as necessary and will most likely 
be enhanced.  
 
The new Directive on anti-trust damage actions adds a codified provision on established case 
law for damage claims in competition law and concretizes it at the same time. On top of the 
previously favored administrative enforcement approach, a private law enforcement 
dimension is added. The reasons given include the need to ensure the effectiveness of 
competition law and the divergences at national level with regard to the private law 
enforcement dimension. No criminal law is desired, either in the competition or in the 
consumer law context. 
 
In the environmental law area, private enforcement plays only a small role—through the 
ELD—and is not mentioned at all in the context of insider trading. The divergence is also 
clear in the domain of criminal law. There is, especially recently, a strong reliance on the 
criminal law in the domain of the environment and insider trading, where directives forcing 
the MS towards criminalization have been issued. On the other hand, criminalization is 
strongly rejected in the competition law area and finds no mention in the consumer law 
area. The public law approach concerning insider trading and environmental law differs in 
the sense that for insider trading the EU had originally introduced a system of administrative 
law enforcement. With the developments in 2014, the criminal law dimension was added. 
For environmental law as it stands there has been no previous base system of administrative 
law enforcement as suggested by the EU. Of course, still in the context of environmental 
law, individual MS do employ administrative sanctions. Last, the recommendation at the 
European level regarding the supply of “collective actions,” no matter which form they 
ultimately take, either public or private enforcement, is relevant horizontally over all 
applicable policy areas. Given the non-binding character of the instrument, its impact is 
limited. The extent to which an enforcement landscape includes elements of collective 
redress—except for very limited fields such as injunctions in consumer cases—is entirely left 
to the discretion of the MS.  
 
D.  Law and Economics of (European) Law Enforcement 
 
The overview of what the Union legislature has done in four domains with respect to law 
enforcement shows, with a large variety in the choice for private of public enforcement as 
well as, within public enforcement, concerning the choice between administrative and 
criminal sanctions. That raises the question of the comparative benefits of private, 
administrative, and criminal enforcement and whether these are the underlying reasons for 
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the diversity. Law and economics has addressed the question of under what conditions a 
particular enforcement mechanism could provide better results.  
 
In Section I, we will develop a theoretical framework by first indicating some of the crucial 
factors which, from an economic perspective, should determine the choice of the 
enforcement approach. Then in Section II, we focus more particularly on the trade-off 
between private and public enforcement and identify the economic criteria that indicate 
which enforcement system might be more effective in particular circumstances. Given the 
space constraints, arguments for and against group litigation can only be dealt with in a very 
preliminary manner. Importantly, group litigation can be designed in any way and thus 
enhance private or public enforcement or both. In Section III, within public enforcement, we 
focus on the question of whether in particular circumstances either administrative or 
criminal enforcement may be more warranted. In Section IV we then bring those criteria 
together in a matrix indicating in which set of circumstances a given type of sanctioning—
civil, administrative, or criminal may be indicated. 
 
Given the space limitations in this paper we limit ourselves to roughly indicating whether 
private, administrative, or criminal enforcement may under particular circumstances be 
indicated for particular violations in the specific fields concerned.142 A final comment 
concerns the language we will use: The term criminal law may not have the same meaning 
in all the MS. For the purpose of our analysis we shall assume that the typical criminal law 
remedies to be granted via a criminal procedure will be fines and imprisonment—but not 
compensation; in administrative law they will be injunctions and fines; in some cases 
remedies such as license revocation are obtainable. In a civil procedure, compensation and 
civil law injunctions will be the main remedies; no punitive damages or civil law fines are 
available.143 In Section E we will apply the enforcement matrix that we have developed 
based on the law and economics literature to the four specific case studies—consumer, 
competition, environmental, and insider trading. This will, therefore, allow us to provide 
indications on the optimal enforcement mix for the specific policy areas, which can then be 
compared to the EU enforcement approach in the same domains.  
 
  
                                            
142 Obviously, it may be possible to have a much more nuanced approach, addressing, for example, whether 
enforcement either via a civil court or via an ADR body would be more indicated or, for example, addressing group 
litigation/collective action in detail. That would, however, for the purposes of this study go much too far and is 
moreover not needed immediately because we merely want to use our general framework to broadly test some of 
the differences in the European approach in law enforcement that we identified in the previous paper. For a more 
refined approach, equally incorporating group litigation, ADR and self-regulation see Franziska Weber, The Law and 
Economics of Enforcing European Consumer Law - A Comparative Analysis of Package Travel and Misleading 
Advertising (2014). 
143 Obviously, this would vary to some extent in the different European countries. 
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I.  Criteria Affecting the Choice 
 
Several economic criteria in law and economics literature on enforcement have been 
identified as determining the strengths and weaknesses of different enforcement 
mechanisms.144 They concern individuals’ incentives to initiate a law enforcement response, 
enforcers’ incentives to carry out the delegated tasks in the enforcement system as desired 
by society, and administrative costs. Regarding the last category, administrative costs as the 
name suggests relate broadly speaking to costs incurred by administering the enforcement 
process. Overall, the underlying idea is that a well-designed enforcement response can 
induce compliant behavior ex ante.145 
 
Different types of violations lead to different actors being motivated to take action. Whether 
they will do so, furthermore, depends on the kind of enforcement mechanism in place. 
Parties will not act if a “rational apathy” problem is prevalent. The rational individual will not 
act if costs outweigh the benefits, for instance when harm is very small and the investment 
to enforce the law is costly.146 If harm to the society is large and law enforcement desirable, 
for example in a case of small and widespread harm, no action may be taken because of a 
divergence between the individual and social incentive to sue.147 The victim may not even 
have a voice, the example, the environment—so-called “victimless crimes.” On the other 
hand, there are cases in which instead of the suing party the defendant turns out to be the 
victim—the victim of a “frivolous lawsuit” that is not based on merits and socially not 
desirable.148 A frivolous case becomes particularly worrisome if a wrong decision is taken 
based on such a “frivolous lawsuit” or complaint. Error costs refer to courts taking mistaken 
decisions.149 It can likewise be extended to other bodies. Error costs can generally be divided 
into two groups. Error I costs are those that occur when an individual who is guilty might 
                                            
144 Steven Shavell, The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement, 36 J. OF L. AND ECON. 255 (1993); Van den Bergh, supra 
note 31, at 179; Franziska Weber, The Law and Economics of Enforcing European Consumer Law (2014), at 33 et 
seq. 
145 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. OF POL. ECON. 169, 172 et seq. (1968). 
146 See Van den Bergh, supra note 31, at 184. 
147 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4(1) J. LEGAL STUD. 1–6, 33 (1975). 
148 See Andrea Renda et al, Making Antitrust Damages Actions More Effective in the EU: Welfare Impact and 
Potential Scenarios (2007), at 562. 
149 See Richard Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, in The Economic 
Structure of the Law: The Collected Economic Essays of Richard A. Posner 290, 291 (Francesco Parisi ed., 2000) 
(referring to system costs as ‘direct costs’ for operating the legal dispute-resolution machinery). 
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mistakenly not be found liable for a “mistaken acquittal.”150 Error II costs on the other hand 
occur if an innocent individual might mistakenly be found liable for a “mistaken conviction.”  
 
Another distortion concerns “free-riding” problems. This problem can occur if in certain 
situations, in which many victims suffer from a law infringement, but all gain as soon as one 
of them complains, it is efficient for everybody to wait for someone else to do so and then 
profit from the result.151 Other factors influence the individual’s incentives to sue. On the 
one hand, it is the remedy that matters, for instance, the motivation stemming from the 
prospect of compensation or a recovery of lost profits. Remedies differ between 
enforcement mechanisms as they are structured today. On the other hand, it concerns 
enforcement mechanisms’ potential to cure information asymmetries that may exist 
between the two parties in conflict. Information asymmetries can be an impediment to 
litigation, which, in turn, leads to—potential—wrongdoers not being induced to legally 
compliant behavior. The information asymmetry can manifest itself in a lack of information 
on the identity of the wrongdoer, which can result in low probabilities of detecting legal 
violations or convicting wrongdoers. It may concern other aspects for which evidence needs 
to be raised or certain aspects of the procedures. Different enforcement mechanisms 
provide for different investigative powers. Lastly, individuals may not intervene because 
they may fear retaliation.152 
 
Whereas so far we have primarily been concerned with the effects that law enforcement 
bodies’ design has on the incentives of individuals whose actions are necessary in initiating 
or refraining from law enforcement, another concern is the possible distortion of the law 
enforcer’s incentives. Deviations from desired behavior are primarily discussed under the 
heading of “capture and principal agent situations”: Capture is an incentive problem, 
meaning the exertion of influence on the public administration that leads to public officials 
pursuing the industries’ interests.153 This concept can be expanded to other enforcers—for 
example, public prosecutors or ADR bodies. A weakness inherent in the client-lawyer 
                                            
150 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, in Handbook of Law and 
Economics 405, 427 et seq. (Vol. 1, A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2007). 
151 See Roger Van den Bergh & Louis Visscher, Optimal Enforcement of Safety Law, in Mitigating Risk in the Context 
of Safety and Security. How Relevant is a Rational Approach? 14 (Richard V. de Mulder ed., 2008); Landes & Posner, 
supra note 147, at 29. 
152 See Shavell, supra note 144, at 268. 
153 See Anthony Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory 57 (1994); Christopher Hood, Henry Rothstein 
& Robert Baldwin, The Government of Risk: Understanding Risk Regulation Regimes, 112 (1st ed. 2001); Nuno 
Garoupa & Fernando Gomez-Pomar, Punish Once or Punish Twice: A Theory of the Use of Criminal Sanctions in 
Addition to Regulatory Penalties, Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business 
Discussion Paper Series. Paper 308 1, 5, 17 (2000); James Wilson, Bureaucracy - What Government Agencies Do and 
Why They Do It (1989). 
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relationship is that agency problems may occur between them.154 Generally, in these 
relationships the client—principal—cannot fully control the quality of the lawyer’s—
agent’s—performance.155 The basis for any principal-agent problem is information 
asymmetry between the two parties,156 which can lead to moral hazard.157 The agent uses 
the principal’s inability to assess the value of the steps the agent takes. This does 
automatically not apply in a context where no lawyer is involved—for example, small claims 
cases. It plays more strongly whenever mass litigation is an issue. 
 
Essentially, it is crucial to look at the victims’ incentives in terms of being potential initiators 
of claims and the enforcers’ incentives with a view to designing a workable system. To fine-
tune the system, the magnitude of the expected sanction and the probabilities of detecting 
a wrong and convicting the wrongdoer play a role. Ideally, few actual enforcement actions 
are carried out because of a well-designed system that is a real threat to committing legal 
violations in the first place. We are, therefore, primarily concerned with the ex ante 
perspective of potential infringers.  
 
II.  Private or Public Enforcement? 
 
1.  Rational Apathy, Error Costs, and Information Asymmetry 
 
We can now analyze how the different factors—rational apathy, error costs, information 
asymmetries etc.—affect the choice between private and public enforcement.158 Essentially, 
we will examine how different mechanisms affect the incentives of the stakeholders to 
comply with the law. Different mechanisms may also create different costs. In this respect, 
we will follow a cost-effectiveness approach, taking a high enforcement level as our goal. 
Within this approach, the desirable design of law enforcement is identified by comparing 
                                            
154 See Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 16 
J. LEGAL STUD, 575, 599 (1997). 
155 See Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship, 10(1) BELL J. ECON. 55, 57 
et seq. (1979); Hugh Collins, Regulating Contracts 236 (1999). 
156 See Karl-Gustaf Löfgren, Torsten Persson & Jorgen W. Weibull, Markets with Asymmetric Information: The 
Contributions of George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz, 104(2) SCANDINAVIAN J. OF ECON. 195 (2002). 
157 See Claudia Keser & Marc Willinger, Experiments on Moral Hazard and Incentives: Reciprocity and Surplus-
Sharing, in The Economics of Contracts Theories and Applications 293 (Eric Brousseau & Jean-Michel Glachant eds., 
2002), in which a whole Section is devoted to the principal agent problem and moral hazard. Moral hazard arises 
because an individual does not internalize the full consequences of actions, and therefore, tends to act less carefully 
than otherwise. 
158 See Franziska Weber & Michael Faure, The Interplay between Public and Private Enforcement in European Private 
Law: Law and Economics Perspective, 4 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 525 (2015). 
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the costs and benefits of achieving the stipulated goal.159 So, when it is possible to reach the 
same goal—in our case, the same degree of compliance—through various means, the 
instrument will be chosen that can reach the particular goal at the lowest cost. The difficulty, 
however, is that the factors indicated in the previous section often imply a trade-off. This 
will immediately be clear when addressing the first choice, for example, if enforcement 
interventions should take place via private or public enforcement. The relevant question in 
terms of the factors identified in the previous section is whether the additional 
administrative costs of an enforcement regime add significantly to the probability that 
eventually a remedy will be imposed. There are a few indicators that may predict whether 
the one—private—or the other—public—enforcement approach may be more effective. 
The choice has its origin in the particular sectorial needs. 
 
A first indicator, strongly related to the rational apathy issue identified above, is whether for 
the particular problem at stake—that hence needs a remedy via enforcement—victims can 
be identified who can and will act in a private enforcement action. This may clearly be the 
case when the losses to each individual victim are relatively large—as a result of which, each 
victim will have sufficient incentives to file a private law suit; those incentives to use the 
private law system will be substantially lower when it is not possible to identify one 
particular victim who suffered a loss or when, in other words, the damage is widespread; 
there are scattered losses. Widespread, scattered losses may therefore be an argument in 
favor of public enforcement because victims may lack the incentives, given rational apathy, 
to initiate private enforcement. With—small and—widely dispersed harm, a case can be 
made for public enforcement, or also some form of group litigation,160 to uphold the threat 
of a lawsuit, as the individual clearly does not have an incentive to sue.161 With 
administrative law enforcement, in the same way as with criminal law enforcement, the 
public as a financer assumes—large parts of—the risks involved in litigation, leading to lower 
costs to the individual.162 Furthermore, within public enforcement unlike in private 
enforcement, actions on an own motion are possible. It is common to public authorities that 
the action they take is beneficial for the whole society. They act in the public interest.  
 
A second indicator may relate to the problem of information asymmetry identified above. In 
some cases, it may simply be impossible, or in economic terms create excessive 
                                            
159 See Anthony Ogus, Costs and Cautionary Tales: Economic Insights for the Law 283 (2006); George J. Stigler, The 
Optimum Enforcement of Law, 78 J. OF POL. ECON. 526 (1970). 
160 Part of the analysis of public law enforcement may likewise be true for the strengths and weaknesses of group 
litigation that could not be dealt with in detail in the context of this paper. 
161 See Steven Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 
333 (1982). To some extent, low cost dispute resolution bodies within the context of private law enforcement, like 
ADR or mediation, might mitigate the problem. 
162 Ultimately, of course, tax payers’ money finances the whole system. 
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administrative costs, for victims to discover the breach or to identify the wrongdoer. When 
information costs to identify a legal breach for the public at large—or specific victims—are 
high, there may be substantial advantages in a public enforcement regime. Public 
enforcement could use economies of scale and expertise of public agencies that would, via 
an ex ante monitoring regime, be able to discover breaches. In reality, we see how wide 
investigative powers are available to public authorities, prosecutors, and the police. If law 
infringements are difficult to discover, an agency’s lower costs of information discovery can 
come in handy;163 this is likewise the case when information becomes highly technical; as in 
the environmental case, for example, when an emission standard has been breached.164 
Economies of scale generally support using the public law system in this context, particularly 
if duplication of enforcement costs among private parties were to occur.165 When locating 
wrongdoers, a public authority may have more powers and the ability to cooperate with 
other authorities—even increasingly with authorities across borders.166 Public law 
enforcement is highly beneficial for tracking down wrongdoers.  
 
Related to this point of information asymmetry is the question of whether legal breaches 
can be discovered before harm occurs. Private enforcement by victims is necessarily based 
on harm which has already occurred. Public enforcement may have the advantage that 
public authorities can engage in ex ante monitoring. This will allow breaches to be 
discovered even before they have caused harm to victims.167 Administrative law 
enforcement allows for continuous information gathering through monitoring or market 
studies to detect infringements. Certain existing information asymmetries that private law 
cannot remedy could to some extent be outweighed by the involvement of a public agency. 
 
Furthermore, in terms of principal agent situations between clients and lawyers, public 
enforcement scores better because typically the lawyer is less crucial in defending the 
                                            
163 A public enforcer has a lower cost of information discovery because it can use the power of the state—such as 
the threat of jail, the power of the police to conduct searches and seizures of evidence, clandestine electronic 
surveillance, and under-cover agents; see Ilya R. Segal & Michael D. Whinston, Public Vs. Private Enforcement of 
Antitrust Law: A Survey, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 335, 6 (2006). (referring to antitrust 
cases). 
164 See Shavell, supra note 145 at 270; Hood, Rothstein & Baldwin, supra note 155, at 73. 
165 See Landes and Posner, supra note 147, at 29: An example would be competition authorities that do not only 
have more resources, but also wide investigate powers that an individual could not make use of. Also economies 
of scope can speak in favor of the involvement of a public authority; see Michael J. Trebilcock, Rethinking Consumer 
Protection Policy, in International Perspectives on Consumers' Access to Justice 68, 84 (Charles Rickett & Thomas 
Telfer eds., 2003). 
166 This is, for example, in the consumer area possible via Regulation 2006/2004 on consumer protection 
cooperation (referred to as the CPC-Regulation) (O.J. (L 364) of December 9, 2004, p. 1–11). 
167 See Fabrizio Cafaggi & Hans-W. Micklitz, Collective Enforcement of Consumer Law: A Framework for Comparative 
Assessment, 16(3) EUR. REV. OF PRIV. L. 391, 417 (2008). 
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victim’s point of view.168 The actual principal agent situation is given between the public 
authority and the public at large. 
 
2.  Administrative Costs and Capturing 
 
For administrative costs, that play a decisive role in the overall cost benefit analysis we 
tentatively set up the following ranking. Because public enforcement requires ex ante 
monitoring and engagement of public agencies as well as public enforcement and 
sanctioning,169 administrative costs of public enforcement may be higher than the costs of 
private enforcement. The consensus is that criminal law enforcement involves very high 
administrative costs.170 In line with our objective to ensure cost-effectiveness, this speaks in 
favor of using the private law option as long as it leads to an effective result, rather than the 
public law option unless there is a particular incentive problem that cannot be overcome. 
 
There is a risk of capture of administrative agencies as a result of which they would no longer 
enforce the law in the public interest to the extent that they are “captured” by the regulated 
community that they are supposed to monitor. Regulating the susceptibility to capture 
would lead to additional administrative costs.  
 
3.  Collective Actions and Remedies 
 
Even if we cannot go into too much detail, we wish to mention that to a large extent 
collective actions can enhance private law enforcement in a similar way that public law 
enforcement can. An action becomes more likely because costs—and hence—rational 
apathy problems are reduced.171 Depending on the players involved, additional investigative 
powers may enter the picture (for example if a public authority is involved). There are some 
problems particular to mass cases, however, such as the aggravated problem of frivolous 
                                            
168A problem with public enforcement is, however—as we will discuss below—that public agencies may be subject 
to capture. 
169 See Donald Wittman, Prior Regulation Versus Post Liability: The Choice between Input and Output Monitoring, 6 
J. LEGAL STUD. 193, 207 (1977); overall little empirical research has been done on regulatory agencies within 
consumer protection; see Stephen Meili, Consumer Protection, in The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research 
176, 186 (Peter Cane & Herbert Kritzereds eds., 2010). 
170 See Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 49 (2004); Francesco Parisi, The Economic Structure 
of the Law the Collected Economic Essays of Richard A. Posner 290 (Vol. 1, 2000). 
171 See Hans-Bernd Schäfer, The Bundling of Similar Interests in Litigation. The Incentives for Class Action and Legal 
Actions taken by Associations, 9(3) EUR. J. L. & ECON. 183, 186 (2000); Hans-W. Micklitz & Astrid Stadler, The 
Development of Collective Legal Actions in Europe, Especially in German Civil Procedure, 17 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 1473, 
1476 (2006). 
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lawsuits172 and principal agent situations173 and typically higher stakes in the game, which 
may lead to capture becoming a more severe problem. In a certain sense, introducing group 
litigation can be seen as an enhancement of private law enforcement.  
 
One can equally think of furthering private law enforcement by introducing low-cost ADR 
solutions, with its own incentive problems,174 or by funding individual claims in different 
ways—for example, by fine-tuning lawyer remuneration schemes or offering legal 
insurances—and many others.175 
 
Although each of those mechanisms may undoubtedly also have potential risks, they are 
important because they can improve the functioning of private enforcement and thereby 
reduce the need to move to the costlier public enforcement system—arguably, however, 
they make private law costlier to administer so this ratio may at some point also change. 
Solutions for the lack of deterrent sanctions or rational apathy problems are also imaginable 
within private law, for instance, by introducing such remedies as punitive damages that 
increase the stakes in private enforcement.176 Either way there are situations in which 
private enforcement may not provide a remedy. This may occur when ex ante monitoring 
and ex post investigations by public agencies are necessary to discover legal violations, and 
when information failures on the side of potential victims mean that particular breaches 
could never be discovered in a private enforcement mechanism. It may, furthermore, be 
preferred due to the other reasons given above. 
 
Lastly, a comment on remedies: Individuals cannot generally obtain compensation via public 
law, which will impact upon the motivation to complain as opposed to private law 
enforcement.177 Note further that the free-riding problem crucially depends on the remedy 
                                            
172 See Roger Van den Bergh & Louis Visscher, The Preventive Function of Collective Actions for Damages in 
Consumer Law, 1 ERASMUS L. REV. 5, 24 (2008); similarly, see Schäfer, supra note 171, at 184. 
173 See Schäfer, supra note 171, at 199; John C. Coffee Jr, Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 
95(6) COLUM. L. REV. 1343–1465, 1414 (1995); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 
VIRGINIA L. REV. 1051, 1113 (1996); Cafaggi & Micklitz, supra note 167, at 411. 
174 This merits a more careful analysis. See Franziska Weber, Is ADR the Superior Mechanism for Consumer 
Contractual Disputes?—an Assessment of the Incentivizing Effects of the ADR Directive, 38(3) J. CONSUMER POL’Y 265 
(2015). 
175 Mark Tuil & Louis Visschereds, New Trends in Financing Civil Litigation—A Legal, Empirical and Economic Analysis 
(2010). 
176 There is a strong objection to the introduction of punitive damages in Europe as set out before. Injunctive relief 
as granted by private bodies may yield similar results in terms of deterrence, see Michael Faure, Anthony Ogus & 
Niels Philipsen, Curbing Consumer Financial Losses: The Economics of Regulatory Enforcement, 31(2) LAW & POL’Y 
161, 176 (2009). 
177 See Shavell, supra note 144, at 267. Other incentives for an individual are the desire to avoid future harm, the 
retributive motive, and possibly a fear of reprisal. 
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obtained via any enforcement branch and whether profiting from the remedy that others 
seek is possible. The extent to which the free-riding problem occurs is interrelated with the 
amount that an individual would need to invest in the law enforcement response—for all. 
 
4.  Summary 
 
The analysis above shows that, given lower costs of the private enforcement system, it may 
be preferable to first examine possibilities to improve the functioning of the private 
enforcement system, in a low cost way, instead of moving to the more costly public 
enforcement. Public enforcement will therefore necessarily play a secondary role and will 
only be employed when, for the reasons mentioned above, private enforcement may not 
prove to be an effective remedy for regulatory breaches. At the same time, the nature of 
the violation may require a specific enforcement tool, as otherwise incentive problems are 
capable of impeding law enforcement altogether. So far we have contrasted private law 
enforcement with public law enforcement. When public enforcement is employed, the next 
question is whether this should take the form of either administrative or criminal 
enforcement. The determining factors of this choice have been singled out.  
 
The criteria may thus point in favor of private enforcements if: (1) there are private victims 
and individual losses are large; (2) victims can easily obtain information on legal violations 
and regarding the wrongdoer, “information is in private hands”; (3) victims have easy and 
cheap access to justice—the more important the lower the individual loss; (4) compensation 
is a desirable goal. 
 
The situations where public enforcement may be preferred are the mirror image: (1) losses 
are widespread or scattered or no individual victim can be identified; (2) victims may lack 
information on legal violations or regarding the wrongdoer—low probabilities of detection 
and conviction in private law; (3) a legal violation may only come to light when substantial 
harm has occurred. 
 
III.  Administrative or Criminal Enforcement? 
 
What are the more specific aspects of the two variants of public enforcement? Whereas in 
both cases the state assumes a large share of the risk, the procedure can work on an own 
motion and investigative powers are given, there are significant differences between the 
two procedures, and between the remedies which can be obtained. 
 
There are a number of effects emanating from the less accurate administrative procedural 
law. This may impact on the speed with which non-meritorious cases are filtered out. Within 
an administrative procedure the danger of error costs depends on the complexity of the 
issues to be solved, and on the resources, expertise, and experience of the public 
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authority.178 The occurrence of error costs is more likely in administrative enforcement 
compared with criminal law enforcement, because the decision making process is less 
elaborate.179 Therefore, naming and shaming by public authorities is, for instance, regarded 
as dangerous.180 If procedural laws are less accurate, a captured public official is more likely 
to be able to influence the procedure undesirably. 
 
Criminal procedural law involves an appeal structure, a standard of proof “beyond 
reasonable doubt” and consideration of the mental element.181 Because of the high 
standard of proof in criminal law, there is a lower probability of convicting the innocent.182 
Error costs depend on the accuracy of procedural law, and the more accurate the procedure 
is, the less often errors occur. When errors do occur, the severity of costs to the accused or 
the victim depends on the severity of the sanctions. Criminal law enforcement typically 
includes more severe sanctions than administrative law enforcement.183 Stigma, for 
example, inflicting a strong disapproval of particular behavior by society, if it is involved in a 
sanctioning mechanism, leads to higher error costs. The reason is that stigma, once inflicted, 
is difficult to restore. High sanctions available in criminal law enforcement are also 
interesting for deterrence purposes to induce compliance in particular when probabilities of 
detection and conviction are low.184 Error costs need to be reduced because where they 
would be widely spread, the result would affect many individuals. 
 
Criminal law enforcement’s investigative powers are even wider than the classical 
investigative powers that an administrative authority has. In particular, where other 
enforcement systems would be impeded, criminal law enforcement—the police—is able to 
locate and apprehend certain wrongdoers and initiate a procedure. Criminal law typically 
                                            
178 See Van den Bergh, supra note 31, at 195; See also Anthony Ogus, Enforcing Regulation: Do we need the criminal 
law?, in New Perspectives on Economic Crime 42, 44 (Hans Sjörgen & Göran Skogheds, 2004) (distinguishing the 
burden of proof and procedural safeguards between criminal law and administrative law from high to low). 
179 See Garoupa & Gomez-Pomar, supra note 153, at 5; Faure, Ogus & Philipsen, supra note 176, at 176. 
180 For details see Faure, Ogus & Philipsen, supra note 176, at 176. 
181 See Roger Bowles, Michael Faure & Nuno Garoupa, The Scope of Criminal Law and Criminal Sanctions: An 
Economic View and Policy Implications, 35(3) J. L. & SOC’Y 405 (2008); Roberto Galbiati & Nuno M. Garoupa, Keeping 
Stigma out of Administrative Law: An Explanation of Consistent Beliefs, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 274 (2007); Keith 
Hylton & Vikramaditya Khanna, Toward an Economic Theory of Pro-Defendant Criminal Procedure, Discussion paper 
No. 318.3 (2001). 
182 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2(2) J. LEGAL STUD. 
399, 410 (1973). 
183 See Van den Bergh, supra note 31, at 196. 
184 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 15051, at 419. On low probabilities of detection; see also Landes & Posner, 
supra note 148, at 36. There is also the possibility to impose fines that exceed the harm.  
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deals with the cases for which the likelihood of apprehending and convicting offenders is 
assumed to be low.185 
 
One important difference between the two is that criminal law can be effective against a 
particular type of wrongdoer, namely the one that turns out to be “judgment-proof”. An 
important advantage of criminal law enforcement in this respect is that the system’s various 
available sanctions include non-monetary ones, primarily imprisonment, which serve to 
remedy the issue of a judgment-proof defendant.186 Imprisonment is essential as a 
deterrent187 and is the optimal sanction when the probability of detection and conviction is 
low and the likelihood of defendants being insolvent is high.188 Sanctions such as license 
revocation available to a public agency might, however, be effective with regard to a 
judgment-proof wrongdoer.189 When administrative law can take ex ante action, criminal 
law is interesting because, unlike other enforcement responses, attempts to do harm can 
also be sanctioned.190 
 
When we argue that criminal law is superior to administrative law because of a reduced risk 
of capture, we need to consider that this may not be true for the public prosecutor, who 
plays an important role and is able to exercise a considerable amount of discretion.191 
 
As mentioned, criminal law is the costlier mechanism to administer. Therefore, 
administrative law should be used as long as it still provides desirable results. In summary, 
criminal law enforcement becomes necessary where: (1) the risk of capture of administrative 
agencies is a severe impediment; (2) where the additional investigative powers are needed/ 
where probabilities of detection are very low; (3) if wrongdoers are judgment proof; (4) in 
                                            
185 See Shavell, supra note 1444, at 275. 
186 See Bowles, Faure & Garoupa, supra note 181, at 402; Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal use of 
Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, COLUM. L. REV. 1247 (1985); Shavell, supra note 165, at 544. 
187 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 15050, at 435. If a person is old or dying from a disease, however, 
imprisonment cannot fulfil its full purpose; see Shavell supra note 166, at 532. Here, for example, incapacitation 
measures are necessary and desirable. 
188 See Bowles, Faure & Garoupa, supra note181, at 405.  
189 See Trebilcock, supra note 16565, at 84; See Faure, Ogus & Philipsen, supra note 17676, at 178, expand on the 
issue of licenses and how this can possibly have a higher deterrent effect for traders than imprisonment. 
190 See Shavell, supra note 165, at 571. 
191 In most legal systems, prosecutors are part of the independent judiciary and stand under the control of the 
Minister of Justice who is subject to political control. He is supposed to make decisions on prosecution and hence 
use his discretion in the public interest. Systems of transparency and accountability, however, can help to guarantee 
that this will effectively be the case in practice. If those are lacking, there is a danger that the available discretion 
would be abused.  
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complex—mass—cases where we need to see a reduction of error costs; (5) when it 
becomes relevant to impose stigmatizing sanctions. 
 
Consequently, where the risks of the less accurate procedural law, linked with effects of 
capture, effect on error costs and frivolous lawsuits are less problematic, administrative law 
should be used. Further considerations are the additional investigative powers and the set 
of judgment-proof offenders. 
 
Notably, whereas civil procedural law and the public law option of administrative law can be 
contrasted regarding the possibility of obtaining compensation, criminal law is a special 
public law enforcement tool. In some jurisdictions compensation can be granted via the 
criminal law branch.192 
 
IV.  The Enforcement Matrix 
 
In this section, we wish to summarize by way of designing a matrix to illustrate the 
circumstances in which generally private enforcement, or more specifically, civil sanctions 
and private liability, could be an effective remedy for violations. The starting point is to look 
for the mechanism that can reach the goal of legal compliance, which is defined by European 
law, at the lowest cost. Given the analysis above, tentatively this means that from the point 
of view of administrative costs the first best solution is private enforcement, second best is 
administrative enforcement and third best is criminal enforcement. Situation-specific 
incentive problems may, however, change this ranking. Moreover, when it is possible to 
improve incentive problems of private enforcement at relatively low costs within the private 
law enforcement framework, this would be preferred because it can reduce the need to 
move to more costly systems of public enforcement.193 This is true up to the point where 
these costs would be higher than adding or alternatively reverting to public law 
enforcement. In some cases, the remedies to improve the functioning of private 
enforcement, such as, for example, introducing group litigation may create its specific 
problems—and costs—as well. Hence, in practice the desirability of improving private 
enforcement will also have to be traded off against the need to use public enforcement. In 
sum the following matrix can be designed: 
 
 
                                            
192 The European country in which this is most developed seems to be Norway: John T. Johnsen, Enforcement of 
Civil Claims in Criminal Litigation: The Norwegian Example, in Enforcement and Enforceability—Tradition and 
Reform 313–326 (Remco van Rhee & Alan Uzelaceds, 2010); for Germany see §§ 403–406d Strafprozessordnung 
(Act on Criminal Procedure, StPO). Similar provisions exist also in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, see 
Anthony Ogus, Michael Faure, and Niels Philipsen, Best Practices for Consumer Policy: Report on the Effectiveness 
of Enforcement Regimes, in Report prepared for the UK Department of Trade and Industry and OECD 37 (2006). 
193 We do realize that this entails the heavy assumption that improving private enforcement is usually less costly 
than using public enforcement. 
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Private enforcement  Public enforcement 
Recommended if: 
 
• Individual large 
losses 
• Violation clear 
• Probability of 
detection 
100%/high 
• Good access to 
justice 
• Compensation 
matters 
Contra-indications: 
 
• Small (widespread) 
losses  
• Bad info on breach 
or wrongdoer 
• Expertise/ 
Investigations and ex 
ante monitoring 
needed 
• If probability of 
detection < 100% 
• If access to justice 
low (because rational 
apathy is at play etc.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+ 
• Reduces costs for 
individuals 
• Ex ante 
monitoring/ 
Intervention before 
breach causes 
harm & 
Investigative 
powers to detect 
breach 
• Can impose high 
sanctions 
• Solves judgment-
proof issue   
- 
• Administrative 
costs higher 
• Capture risk 
(particularly if 
administrative) 
• Error costs 
(particularly if 
administrative) 
 
Cures for contra-indications: 
 
• Group litigation 
• ADR procedures/ mediation capture low-
value claims 
• Any type of funding of claims 
• Punitive damages 
 
 
BUT: Public law enforcement unavoidable 
for a certain share of cases (requiring 
investigative powers);  can be by way of 
group litigation with the help of a public 
authority 
Administrative 
enforcement  
recommended if: 
 
• Benefit to 
violator not high 
• P of detection 
reasonable 
• Case not too 
complex 
• No need for non-
monetary sanctions 
• Not too many 
individuals 
affected; otherwise 
mistake may 
spread 
• No need to 
impose stigmatizing 
sanction 
Criminal  
Enforcement very 
costly, hence only 
recommended if: 
 
• Benefit of 
violation high 
• P of detection low 
• Need for non-
monetary sanctions 
• Need to impose 
stigmatizing 
sanctions 
• Avoiding capture 
is crucial 
Table 2: The enforcement matrix 
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E.  Narrowing Down the l & E Findings to the Individual Areas 
 
In this section, the general findings from the law and economics literature will be applied to 
the four selected areas. We will ask the simple question—but the answer is obviously not 
simple at all—whether the nature of the particular areas and the potential violations 
involved give rise to a particular mix of private, administrative, or criminal enforcement with 
a view to their comparative advantages.  
 
I.  Consumer Law 
 
There is undoubtedly room for individual private enforcement of consumer law, to the 
extent that individual consumer losses are large. The classic example that is often provided 
is the one of a disappointing holiday.194 This is an obvious case where the losses could be 
large inducing an individual consumer to act. There may, however, be many cases as well 
where losses are small (and possibly widespread) and hence a rational apathy problem could 
occur. Examples include unsound investment advice by a financial consultant, non-
transparent price calculations,195 and the signing without reading of standard form 
contracts.196 Moreover, there are also possibilities to improve the rational apathy problem 
as well as to increase access to justice by ADR solutions, for instance. All solutions mentioned 
in the matrix could be of use.  
 
More particularly, with some of the examples of widespread, scattered losses ex ante 
monitoring via a public enforcement agency may be indicated. Also in consumer law, some 
public enforcement may be required. The advantage of public enforcement in the consumer 
law case is that with ex ante monitoring by an agency it becomes possible to discover and 
remedy breaches that individual consumers may not discover. Likewise, detailed 
investigations may be beneficial and necessary for certain types of violations and 
wrongdoers. In most cases, administrative sanctions and more particularly administrative 
fines may suffice.197 The benefits to the violator will not often be that high, detection of 
violation by public authorities is still possible and there may be no need to impose a 
stigmatizing sanction. In case of so-called rogue traders, however, who intentionally violate 
consumer law to obtain profits, there may be a need to refer to criminal sanctions and even 
                                            
194 Van den Bergh, supra note 31, at 195. 
195 Van den Bergh, supra note 31, at 186. 
196 Gerrit De Geest, The Signing-without-reading Problem: An Analysis of the Directive on Unfair Contract Terms, in 
KonsequenzenwirtschaftlicherNormen 213 (Hans-Bernd Schäfer& Hans-Jürgen Lwowskieds, 2002). 
197 See Faure, Ogus & Philipsen, supra note 176, at 173–76. 
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imprisonment in extreme cases.198 This could more particularly be the case when the 
traders’ conduct is generating large amounts of damage to the public199 and when the trader 
would be a “fly by night” operator who regularly leaves insolvent companies behind and 
would thus not be deterred through administrative sanctions.  
 
In sum: (1) private enforcement may be the primary instrument; (2) all “internal” solutions 
to improve the working of private enforcement could be employed here; (3) for particular 
cases of small and widespread losses and those which are difficult to detect and where the 
wrongdoer is difficult to locate, public enforcement may be indicated; (4) in most cases, 
administrative sanctions will suffice; an administrative agency is limited regarding the 
remedies, therefore this route is only desirable where injunctions or fines, typically available 
to such authorities, are sought. This may be particularly interesting if the agency acted on 
an own motion; (5) there is only a need to resort to the criminal law in extreme cases—rogue 
traders. It can function as a backup. If it does, the possibility of obtaining damages via 
criminal law may be interesting. Criminal sanctions should always be available for cases of 
judgment-proof wrongdoers. 
 
II.  Competition Law 
 
Again, there is substantial scope, as in the consumer law case, for applying private 
enforcement. The case for private enforcement in the competition law case may even be 
stronger because the victims in this case may not only be consumers, but potentially other 
traders—suffering from the anti-competitive behavior—as well or professional buyers in the 
supply chain.200 To provide them with incentives to sue from an economic point of view, 
punitive damages may be warranted.201 To solve the rational disinterest of named 
individuals, group litigation, and funding solutions may be of help. Alternatively, 
administrative fines may do. 
 
                                            
198 This was discussed in the same way at the Fachexpertengespräche 2014 with consumer law experts from 
Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Luxemburg and Liechtenstein at the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer 
Protection, Berlin, 16/17 November 2014. 
199 Faure, Ogus & Philipsen, supra note 176, at 180. 
200 A strong case in favor of private law enforcement is made by Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Defying 
Conventional Wisdom: The Case for Private Antitrust Enforcement, 48 GA. L. REV. 1 (2013). The same authors 
acknowledge a stronger deterrent effect of private law enforcement than of criminal law enforcement of antitrust 
laws in the US. Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Comparative Deterrence From Private Enforcement and Criminal 
Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws, BYU L. REV. 315, 317 (2011). Given the different nature of law enforcement 
in the US and the EU, they assert a positive effect of the Directive on antitrust damages and claim that it does not 
go far enough (Robert H. Lande, The Proposed Damages Directive: The Real Lessons from the United States, (2014), 
University of Baltimore Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2014-19. 
201 See for a detailed analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of punitive damages, Lotte Meurkens, Punitive 
Damages: The Civil Remedy in American Law, Lessons and Caveats for Continental Europe (2014). 
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The costs of uncovering violations of competition law may sometimes be quite high.202 
Traders may easily conceal breaches of competition law and especially for consumers at 
large the necessary expertise to identify anti-competitive behavior may be lacking. The need 
for public enforcement in the competition law case may, therefore, be even stronger—given 
the highly technical nature of the violation—than in the case of consumer law.  
 
Again, in most cases administrative fines may suffice to deter violations of competition law.  
There may be cases, however—for example, price fixing via hard core cartels—where 
breaches are clearly intentional and where traders will take special care to hide their anti-
competitive behavior, thus reducing the probability of detection. Moreover, potential 
benefits of violations may be substantially higher than in the case of consumer law.203 This 
may therefore bring about a need to impose high monetary sanctions to outweigh the low 
probability of detection and high potential profits. In some cases, those optimal monetary 
sanctions may be higher than the assets of the trader involved in the anti-competitive 
behavior. So that may justify the need for the use of criminal sanctions—more particularly 
imprisonment—for exceptional cases of anti-competitive behavior.204 
 
Summarizing: (1) private enforcement can again be the primary tool; (2) solutions to improve 
private enforcement, more particularly group litigation and punitive damages, can be 
employed; (3) given that it is difficult to detect the nature of the violations public 
enforcement is certainly needed; (4) in most cases administrative enforcement—via fines—
may suffice; (5) but given the high potential profits and low probability of detection, criminal 
sanctions—non-monetary sanctions—may be needed as well.  
 
III.  Environmental Law 
 
Again, environmental damage may cause harm to individual victims, thus justifying private 
enforcement, but in many cases environmental harm may  be widespread and could damage 
a large area and many victims; there may be some cases that cause no direct harm to 
individuals at all. There may, however, also in the environmental area, be scope to improve 
private enforcement. One way of dealing with rational disinterest is to grant the right to sue 
                                            
202 Van den Bergh, supra note 71, at 17. 
203 Generally, violations of competition law—more particularly, hardcore cartels—can generate high gains, in 
principle substantially higher than, for example, misleading advertising on a—still—competitive market. 
204 See Wouter P.J. Wils, Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer?, 28 WORLD COMPETITION 117 (2005); 
Roger Van den Bergh & Michael Faure, Critical Issues in the Enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law in China: A Law 
and Economics Perspective, in Competition Policy and Regulation. Recent Developments in China, the US and Europe  
54, 56 et seq. (Michael Faure & Xinzhu Zhang eds., 2011). 
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on behalf of the environment to NGOs—in order to remedy the breach of environmental 
law, ADR solutions may also improve access to justice.205 
 
The problem is that breaches of environmental law may lead to substantial damage when 
they occur and, moreover, those breaches will often not be discovered on the basis of 
complaints. Often violations of environmental law are of a highly technical nature, which 
requires specific expertise. This is a clear case where ex ante monitoring via public 
enforcement is necessary to detect breaches. Priority will therefore be with the public 
enforcement system and more particularly with environmental breaches that cannot be 
easily discovered; the role for private enforcement is mostly given where private nuisance 
causes harm to individual victims.  
 
Many breaches of environmental regulations can be deterred via administrative fines.206 
This is especially the case for so-called administrative violations, for example, where 
administrative rules are violated but no concrete environmental harm has been caused—
yet. The benefits of those administrative violations may be limited and public authorities 
may easily discover the violation as a result of which the probability of detection should not 
be low. In those cases administrative fines may also suffice because there is no need to 
impose stigmatizing sanctions. In some cases, however, the benefit to the perpetrator and 
the social cost to society may be substantially larger. That may be the case when the 
violation does not only consist of a breach of regulatory duties, but also of concrete harm to 
the environment, e.g. through emissions or disposal of waste. Those violations are often 
intentional, lead to huge benefits, e.g. avoiding the payment of fees for legal waste disposal, 
and the probability of detection, for example, to discover who illegally deposited dangerous 
waste, may be low. These could well be cases where criminal enforcement may be indicated, 
and also where benefit from the stigmatizing effect of the criminal sanction may be 
gained.207 
 
Summarizing: (1) the primary enforcement system for most environmental violations may 
be public enforcement; (2) private enforcement may still play a subsidiary role where 
environmental harm reaches individual victims; (3) rights of actions of NGOs and ADR may 
remedy rational disinterest and barriers to access to justice; (4) administrative fines may 
suffice in cases of violation of regulatory—administrative—duties; (5) when concrete harm 
to the environment is caused, criminal enforcement has its place. 
 
                                            
205 See Michael Faure & Franziska Weber, Dispersed Losses in Tort Law—An Economic Analysis, 6(2) J. EUR. TORT L. 
163 (2015). 
206 This has inter alia strongly been argued by Anthony Ogus & Carolyn Abbot, Sanctions for Pollution: Do We Have 
the Right Regime?, 13 J. ENVTL. L. 283 (2002). 
207 Michael Faure, Environmental Crimes, in Criminal Law and Economics 320 (Vol. 3, Nuno Garoupa ed., 2009). 
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IV.  Insider Trading Law 
 
The insider trading case is to some extent comparable to the competition law case in the 
sense that different victim groups could be distinguished that may have different incentives 
to use private enforcement. On the one hand, there is the potentially large group of 
individuals active on the stock market who may feel disadvantaged as a result of the insider 
trading because, if they had had the inside information, they could have made profits as 
well. This group is potentially very large and the losses may be widespread as a result, of 
which the rational disinterest will be large.208 On the other hand, there may also be a group 
of shareholders of the particular company in which insider trading of shares took place, who 
are much more directly affected by the consequences of the inside trade. This will, more 
particularly, be the case when insiders were aware of bad news, sold stock, and, in this way, 
also created a further decline of stock prices to the—alleged—detriment of other 
shareholders who lacked the inside information. For them the incentives to use the private 
enforcement system may be substantially larger, given their more direct involvement in the 
company and presumably larger losses suffered. Moreover, to the extent that rational 
disinterest or access to justice problems would exist, the solutions mentioned; more 
particularly group litigation, punitive damages and fine-tuning lawyer remuneration, could 
provide a remedy. Again, there are traditional reasons to argue that private enforcement 
may not suffice.209 The problem with insider trading remains that it can be extremely difficult 
to discover insider trading, more particularly given the fact that this is based on “inside” 
information and that the trading may often take place indirectly via so-called tippees.210 This 
may require monitoring by public enforcement agencies and hence public enforcement. 
There may be an information problem with private enforcement because the necessary 
evidence cannot be collected.211 For this and other reasons—for example, a lot of 
                                            
208 See Michael Faure & Claire Leger, Towards a Harmonization of Insider Trading. Criminal Law at EU Level?, 9(2) 
BROOKLYN J. CORP., FIN. & COMMERCIAL L. 387 (2015); Nasser Arshadi, Insider Trading Liability and Enforcement 
Strategy, 27(2) FIN. MGMT. 70, 71 (1998) (regarding the US law at that time):  
Since managers and directors are often the beneficiaries in insider 
trading, they have little incentive to sue; given that most shareholders 
own a small fraction of the outstanding shares, they often cannot 
afford the cost of taking legal action. The principal incentive to the 
enforcement of this section is left with attorneys who track 16(a) filings 
and file suit on behalf of a small shareholder where the court grants 
fees for the plaintiff's attorneys. 
209 Standard literature: Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 151—public enforcement is optimal when it is too costly for 
the individual to identify the wrongdoer. 
210 This refers to persons providing “tips”, meaning, relevant information which may affect stock prices. James D. 
Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A critical response to the “Chicago School”, DUKE L. J. 628, 658 (1986) sees 
scope for economies of scale and benefits of public enforcement. 
211 This is suggested for the US context, Ventoruzzo, supra note 1140, at 589. 
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circumstantial evidence—private individuals are allegedly rarely motivated to sue. If well-
coordinated, one may see a scope for private law enforcement being aided by information 
generated within public law enforcement.212 
 
In many cases of insider trading, administrative enforcement and more particularly 
administrative fines may suffice. One reason is that the benefit generated through insider 
trading may not be that large. A study in the US showed that the median gain or loss in 
insider trading cases was $25,800.213 A problem with insider trading though, is that the 
probability of detection may not be large. Given the fact that it concerns violations dealing 
with confidential and anonymous information where often proxies or intermediaries are 
used, it may be difficult to detect insider trading.214 Given these indications, insider trading 
may need substantial administrative fines to outweigh the lower probability of detection. 
Insider traders, however, can be assumed to belong to the community of rather wealthy 
individuals who may not directly be judgment proof. As a result, in most cases insider trading 
may be deterred through administrative fines without the need to resort to criminalization.  
 
Drawing some more inspiration from the US context, it is voiced how insider trading is “an 
extraordinarily difficult crime to prove.”215 Direct evidence of insider trading is rare, 
evidence is almost entirely circumstantial and difficult to assemble in the right way. 
Therefore, public enforcement may be more warranted. Private enforcement plays a minor 
role, though.216 A recent study suggests that one may need to distinguish cases: Individual 
actors are unlikely to discern insider trading in impersonal markets.217 Here, public 
enforcement may be warranted. 
 
In a related field, securities law, effective strategies may be an emphasis on standardized 
disclosure and a reliance on private dispute resolution, using tools that facilitate recovery of 
                                            
212 Private actions in the US are arguably free-riding on the investigations carried out by the SEC, see Cox, supra 
note 210, at 658. 
213 Elizabeth Szockyj & Gilbert Geis, Insider Trading: Patterns and Analysis, 30 J. CRIM. JUST. 273 (2002). 
214 See Jonathan R. Macey, Insider Trading: Economics, Politics and Policy 5 (1991); Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider 
Trading as an Agency Problem IN PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS, JOHN W. PRATT & RICHARD 
ZECKHAUSER EDS, 81 (1985). 
215 Thomas C. Newkirk, Speech by SEC Staff: Insider Trading—A U.S. Perspective, 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch221.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2016). 
216 See J.C. Coffee Jr., Introduction: Mapping the Future of Insider Trading Law: Of Boundaries, Gaps, and Strategies, 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 281 (2013), footnote 3, observing that “insider trading is seldom enforced through private 
litigation, but instead through criminal and SEC enforcement.” as quoted by Ventuzzo. 
217 Laura N. Beny, Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary Comparative Evidence, 7(1) AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
144, 176 (2005). 
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losses by investors.218 These were shown to influence growth in the stock market. They 
found no clear evidence that a public regulator or criminal sanctions would matter. 
 
Summarizing: (1) private enforcement may be an interesting tool to deter some insider 
trading; (2) solutions to deal with the rational disinterest, such as group litigation, punitive 
damages or special fee agreements with lawyers, may improve the working of private 
enforcement; (3) given the difficulty of detecting insider trading, public enforcement and ex 
ante monitoring may be indicated; (4) in most cases, administrative fines may suffice to 
deter insider traders; (5) there does not seem to be an immediate need to resort to criminal 
sanctions, unless one wanted to profit from stigmatizing the offender. 
 
V.  Assessing the EU’s Approach in the Light of the Economic Analysis of Law 
 
1.  The EU Versus the Matrix 
 
In the same way we summarized the EU approach to enforcement in the four domains,219 
we can now summarize which would be the optimal use of the various enforcement 
mechanisms from the perspective of the optimal model. The findings just presented can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
 
 Private Administrative Criminal 
Consumer Yes Yes Limited (for rogue 
traders) 
Competition Yes Yes Yes 
Environment Limited Yes Limited 
IT Limited Yes Very Limited 
Table 3: The enforcement matrix applied 
 
 
The mismatch of the European approach to law enforcement and an economic approach 
becomes immediately apparent when we confront the optimal solutions with EU law. We 
can relatively simply compare the EU approach towards enforcement, as it was summarized 
                                            
218 As identified by Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, What Works with Securities Law, 
LXI(1) THE J. FIN. 1, 27 (2006). Beny, supra note 2173, at 174 finds, on the other hand, that public law enforcement 
seems to be more important. The most deterrent effect stems from the possibility to impose criminal sanctions. 
The author acknowledges, however, that no account was taken of liability rules, allocations of evidentiary burdens 
or general rules of litigation, and administrative procedure (p. 176) which is why no strong conclusions can be drawn 
from the study yet. 
219 See supra Table 1. 
2017 Diversity of the EU Approach to Law Enforcement 873 
             
in table 1 with the ideal model based on the literature, as it was summarized in table 3. A 
merged table looks like this: 
 
 
 Private Adm. Crim. 
Model EU Model EU Model EU 
Cons. Yes 
 
Yes 
Injunctions 
ADR/mediation  
Yes Limited/only 
CPC context 
Limited 
(for 
rogue 
traders) 
No 
Comp. Yes Yes 
Directive  
Yes Yes 
Provisions on 
fines 
Yes No 
Env. Limited Limited (only 
ELD) 
Yes No  Limited Yes 
Insider 
Trading 
Limited  No Yes Yes Very 
Limited 
Yes 
Table 4: The EU and enforcement matrix combined 
 
 
This interesting table, comparing the different approaches towards enforcement in the EU 
with the ideal enforcement model, shows that for some particular domains the EU approach 
seems to follow the model, whereas for others it does so less. Moreover, it provides some 
explanation for the differences that could be found in the EU approach towards enforcement 
as summarized in table 1, but only to some extent.  
 
Taking the private law approach, this is present, as the model suggests, in the consumer law 
area and is further suggested—again in line with the model—in the domain of competition 
law. It is, however, completely absent in the EU approach towards insider trading, whereas 
according to the model there may be room for private enforcement of insider trading as 
well. The EU legislation regarding private law enforcement of environmental law is largely in 
line with the suggestions. 
 
Administrative enforcement—public enforcement, thus providing powers for pro-active 
monitoring, but also administrative fines for minor offences—is in fact needed for all cases, 
based on the theoretical approach. In the EU, it is only the primary instrument in competition 
law, and it has been—modestly—suggested in the consumer law area—the authorities have 
no competences to fine traders—and was the predominant system in the domain of insider 
trading before the 2014 Directive introduced criminal sanctions. In the environmental area 
it is, at least at EU level, completely absent.  
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The strongest differences between the model and the EU approach seem to appear in 
criminal law. There is a strong theoretical argument in favor of criminalizing  competition 
law, for all three other policy areas the reasoning is less strong—for example, only for few 
incidents of rogue traders or for particular cases of concrete endangerment of the 
environment. For insider trading, the argument for criminalization is rather weak. Here, 
surprisingly, the EU comes to opposite results, having forced MS to criminalize strongly in 
the environmental area, which to some extent can still be understood, but also in the field 
of insider trading—where it may be less obvious. Criminalization is, however, totally absent 
in the domains of competition law, where it is strongly indicated, and consumer law where, 
at least for particular cases, it may be indicated. This shows clear inconsistencies when in 
comparable contexts, criminal law is suggested or not. 
 
Also, when one looks at the differences in approaches in a horizontal way, which addresses 
the different sectors, the deviations are obvious. The areas of consumer and environmental 
law are most aligned with the suggestions from the model, but that is surely not the case for 
insider trading where there is a strong reliance on criminalization and possibilities of private 
enforcement are not explored at all.  
 
Of course, to some extent one could argue that it would not suffice to merely look at 
enforcement instruments at EU level because in most of the domains that have been 
discussed, MS have also developed enforcement rules. That is undoubtedly the case, but it 
does, if only to a minor extent explain the striking differences in approaches between the 
different areas. It would only make sense if, for example, the EU would have established that 
private enforcement has been developed in a satisfactory manner for insider trading at MS 
level and that for that reason—given subsidiarity—no EU action in that domain is warranted. 
Similarly, the EU could have examined whether criminalization of competition law already 
sufficiently exists at Member State level, which would reduce the need for such a measure 
at EU level. But such exercises have not been undertaken and so could not serve as a 
justification for the differences. Moreover, the deviations from the model at EU level do not 
always represent a flaw; in the sense that the EU does not suggest enforcement whereas 
the model would. In particular cases, such as criminal law, the EU approach may go too far, 
compared to the model. Especially when comparing the combination of different 
instruments, it is striking that in particular domains—such as the environment—the focus 
has been solely on one instrument—criminal law—whereas the possibilities to develop 
other instruments—private and administrative enforcement—have not been sufficiently 
examined. For insider trading the focus has lately shifted from administrative to criminal law, 
leaving the addressees doubting the precise interaction. Hence, in those domains EU law 
also misses out in the “smart mixes” of policy instruments.220 Clearly the approach within 
the EU as such lacks coherence and cannot be explained by an economic rationale. 
                                            
220 See generally on policy mixes, the seminal work of Neil Gunningham & Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation. 
Designing Environmental Policy (1998). 
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2.  Explaining Divergences: An Attempt 
 
Generally, various explanations are provided in the literature when at a regulatory level 
particular deviations are found from the optimal design. One such powerful explanation is 
the influence of strong interest groups. Public choice theory has predicted that particularly 
single-issue oriented interest groups may lobby the government in order to extract rents 
from beneficial regulation.221 Others have argued that bureaucrats could be “captured” by 
the regulated industry.222 The danger of regulation being made to favor private rather than 
public interests is supposed to be especially large when there is no counter-vailing power to 
balance the influence of industry.223 It has especially been held that in an environment 
where there is little transparency and hence high information costs for the public at large, 
the likelihood that special interest groups will succeed in obtaining legislation to their 
advantage may increase. Some have argued that the EU is an ideal forum for successful 
lobbying by interest groups, given the complex and rather opaque decision-making at the 
EU level.224 Hence, some of the deviations we found could be explained by interest group 
politics. That would then especially be a factor explaining why particular efficient 
instruments have not been introduced at EU level. For example, for the area of competition 
law, one could well imagine that industry would lobby against criminalization. It is then 
difficult to understand, however, why industry would be successful in opposing 
criminalization in the field of competition law, but not in the areas of environment and 
insider trading where they are presumably equally strong. Further detailed research, 
explaining the relative strength of the particular interest groups in that field, might provide 
further insights, but at first look the interest group explanation does not seem to be 
particularly powerful. Obviously, interest groups could also, instead of directly lobbying the 
EU level, lobby national politicians which could lead to MS exercising pressure on the EU 
level in favor of or against a particular enforcement strategy. Even if it were MS, however, 
rather than interest groups directly that would lobby at EU level, it is still not understandable 
                                            
221See generally Jane S. Shaw, Public Choice Theory (2002), 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/PublicChoiceTheory.html (last visited March 3, 2016) (discussing public 
choice theory, which models the way that interest groups affect collective decision making); see Michael T. Maloney 
& Robert E. McCormick, A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation, 25 J. L. & ECON. 99 (1982). 
222 See generally George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2(1) BELL J. OF ECON. 3 (1971); Sam Peltzman, 
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, J. L. & ECON. 211 (1976). 
223 See generally Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98(3) 
QUARTERLY J. ECON. 371, 386, 394–95 (1983), (asserting that non-cooperative competition between pressure groups 
for political influence favors efficiency). Empirical evidence of the importance of such a countervailing power is, in 
the environmental area, inter alia provided by Seth Binder & Eric Neumayer, Environmental Pressure Group 
Strength and Air Pollution: An Empirical Analysis, 55(4) ECOLOGICAL ECON. 527, 528 (2005). 
224 See Michael Faure, Jürgen Lefevere & Roger Van den Bergh, The Subsidiarity Principle in European Environmental 
Law: An Economic Analysis, in Law and Economics of the Environment 121 (Erling Eide & Roger Van den Bergh eds., 
1996). 
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why, for example, MS would lobby in favor of criminal enforcement in the cases of 
environmental and insider trading law and not in other domains. 
 
A second line of reasoning consists of what is referred to as “path dependency”. This refers 
to the fact that institutions and individuals often continue on a chosen path, simply because 
this is how it happened in the past, not questioning whether that is the best solution.225 Path 
dependency could, for example, explain that in the environmental area, because the case 
law of the court of justice of the EU awarding the Commission competences to force MS 
towards criminalization,226 the entire focus of the Commission has merely been on 
criminalization, thus not paying attention to the question of whether the same goals could 
equally be reached with other instruments—private enforcement or administrative 
enforcement. Bureaucrats would in that framework simply continue on the chosen path of 
criminalization. Yet again, it is then not so clear why this criminalization path is originally 
chosen, for example, for environmental and insider trading issues, but not for others. It also 
does not explain why various proposals are made to improve private enforcement in the 
areas of consumer and competition law, but not in the areas of environment or insider 
trading.  
 
A more plausible, albeit rather simple explanation probably concerns the division of 
competences within the European Commission. The various domains examined belong to 
competences of different directorates-general (DG) and it has been described in the 
literature that there is to some extent competition between those DG’s and that 
collaboration and information exchange is in some cases lacking.227 Again, it would require 
a further detailed analysis of the law making process at EU level but it seems plausible that, 
for example, the environmental and market DG’s had their mind strongly set on 
criminalization, largely ignoring private enforcement and developments that are taking place 
in that domain in the consumer and competition area, whereas DG’s Sanco and Comp had 
apparently their minds more set on ways to improve private enforcement, and to some 
extent administrative enforcement, ignoring the potential of criminal enforcement.228 Once 
the minds of bureaucrats had been set on the necessity of a particular instrument, path 
dependency could further explain why it was difficult to change the route that was once 
                                            
225 See Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems are not Converging, 46 INT’L & COMPARATIVE L. Q. 52 (1996); Wolfgang 
Kerber & Klaus Heine, European Corporate Laws, Regulatory Competition and Path Dependence, 13 EUR. J. OF L. AND 
ECON. 47 (2002); Anthony Ogus, The Economic Basis of Legal Culture: Networks and Monopolization, 22(3) OXFORD 
J. OF LEGAL STUD. 419 (2002). 
226 For details see the discussion supra section C III 2. 
227 Les Metcalfe, Reforming the Commission: Will Organizational Efficiency Produce Effective Governance?, 38(5) J. 
OF COMMON MKT. STUD. 817 (2000); Roger P. Levy, European Commission Overload and the Pathology of 
Management Reform: Garbage Cans, Rationality and Risk Aversion, 84(2) PUB. ADMIN. 423 (2006). 
228 The names and competences of the individual DGs also keep changing. 
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chosen. Although we do not have strong proof, we presume that this may explain the rather 
diverse picture of enforcement in EU law as it is summarized in table 1. 
 
3.  Policy Conclusion: Towards a Coherent Approach 
 
In this respect, we can be relatively short and modest: Short, because our summary of the 
theoretical literature leads to a possible combination of different enforcement instruments 
in table 3. At the same time, we should be modest, because we do realize that especially the 
rough summary in table 3 is not sufficiently balanced to capture complex realities. Trading-
off the various criteria in table 2 we provided a more balanced picture concerning the 
optimal combination of different enforcement instruments. At the same time, it also shows 
that it is probably not possible to suggest the use of just one instrument for one particular 
area, but that based on the criteria one will come to differentiated suggestions on combining 
various instruments in an optimal way. 
 
In that sense, our suggestions concerning an optimal mix of instruments could, of course, be 
completed with issues we have not discussed in this contribution, like the possibility of using 
collective actions within private enforcement. To some extent, collective actions may as 
well, as we have indicated above, remedy some of the problems of classic private 
enforcement, like rational apathy following from the widespread nature of the damage, as 
public enforcement could. Hence, to the extent that collective actions would be stimulated 
this could, within the optimal mix, reduce the need for public enforcement. The Commission 
is more aware of the necessity of horizontal harmony regarding the matter of collective 
actions. The recommendation applies to various policy areas: Consumer and competition, 
but also environment and financial services and it is kept open for which other sectors it may 
be suitable.229 
 
That is precisely the point of our paper: When developing enforcement instruments, it would 
be preferable to do this on the basis on the relative strengths of different instruments in the 
particular fields. We have provided the criteria that could be used which could lead to a 
more structural approach to enforcement in the future. We have shown which results this 
would suggest for the areas under investigation. The analysis could likewise be extended to 
other domains of EU policy. 
 
F.  Conclusion 
 
The Article began by identifying the EU’s competences for law enforcement in various policy 
areas. There is no such thing as a general competence for EU law enforcement. The 
provisions are, as a matter of fact, most pronounced with a view to criminal law with the 
respective treaty article. This article is applicable for basically any policy area. On private or 
                                            
229 See Recommendation. 
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administrative law enforcement, the EU competences are less explicit. Most of what has 
been developed, however, for instance in the CJEU case law, again applies generally to any 
area of the law. 
 
Next, the different use that was made of the legislative competences with a view to 
enforcement measures was illustrated in detail. Depending on the policy area under review 
the suggestions vary considerably. We do not necessarily find a pure reliance on one 
mechanism, but also attempt to mix enforcement mechanisms. The EU Commission’s 
motivations differ according to the policy area. The EU’s competences are indeed wide and 
horizontal enough to enable such a diverse picture. The question, therefore, emerges of 
whether the choices are justified with a view to a consistent pattern. As such, they look very 
inconsistent. 
 
Now, it would obviously be comforting to know that there is an overarching logic in the EU’s 
approach to enforcement. To test whether the differences are due to different sectorial 
needs is the next step that needs to be taken, which we will subsequently carry out. Let us 
provocatively say that the idea suggests itself that the different approaches could be due to 
some lack of a coherent enforcement policy in the EU—a missing horizontal approach that 
lacks a legislative rationale.230 We suspect that there is a lack of horizontal convergence, 
except for the context of collective redress where the EU has, however, not come any further 
than a recommendation.  
 
The question we examined, next, in this Article is whether those different approaches to 
these different policy areas were justified, considering the economic approach to optimal 
enforcement mixes between private, administrative, and criminal enforcement in the light 
of a cost-effectiveness approach, for example, favoring the mechanism that can achieve a 
high level of compliance at lowest costs. Our finding was that there are deviations between 
the optimal mix of various enforcement approaches and the approach currently followed by 
the EU in various policy areas. The reasons for those divergences are not always very clear. 
We suggest that there is a lack of coordination within the European Commission. This may 
well be the most important reason for the diversification, which does not always make sense 
from an economic perspective. This is particularly true with a view to the use of the criminal 
law. Regarding private and administrative enforcement, EU action seems much more in line 
with the law and economics model. 
 
Obviously, our analysis was limited to a rough sketch of private, administrative, and criminal 
enforcement and could and should be refined by looking deeper into the particular 
                                            
230 With the new Juncker Commission, the traditional restructuring of the DGs and their areas of competence has 
again taken place, http://ec.europa.eu/about/juncker-commission/structure/index_en.htm (last visited February 
14, 2016). 
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instruments used within those domains. This would allow us to come to refined conclusions 
on optimal mixes of particular instruments. 
 
The EU will, in the coming years, undoubtedly increase its actions as far as regulating 
enforcement is concerned. The goal of our contribution was to indicate that it would be wise 
to strive for consistency in the way in which the EU will take further action in this domain in 
the future. As we have indicated, the law and economics literature with respect to optimal 
enforcement mixes may provide a useful tool to provide the necessary consistency in that 
respect. At the same time, we should be modest, because we do realize that especially the 
rough summary in table 3 is not sufficiently balanced to capture complex realities. Still, by 
attempting to trade-off the various economic criteria, we provided a more balanced picture 
concerning the optimal combination of different enforcement instruments. When 
developing enforcement instruments, it would be preferable to do this considering the 
relative strengths of different instruments in the particular fields, rather than on the basis 
of path dependency and the preferences within particular directorates of the European 
Commission. At the same time, our results also show that it is probably not possible to 
suggest the use of just one instrument for one particular area, but that based on the criteria 
one will come to differentiated suggestions on combining various instruments in an optimal 
way. 
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